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IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
LOCAL 144 S.E.I.U.

OPINION AND AWARD

and
SEA CREST HEALTH CARE CENTER
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Are the grievances of RAYMOND BROWN and CHARLES FIORE
arbitrable?
If so, was there just cause for the suspensions of RAYMOND BROWN
and CHARLES FIORE, and if not what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held on May 10 and June 6, 1996 at which time
Messrs. Brown and Fiore, hereinafter referred to as the "grievants" and
representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. The Arbitrator's
Oath was waived.
The Employer's assertion that the grievances are not arbitrable
is based on two arguments.

First, that the grievances are untimely and

secondly and alternatively, they were settled at a grievance meeting.
The grievants were suspended on August 21, 1995.

The first

written grievance on behalf of Mr. Brown was filed with the Undersigned by
letter dated December 19, 1995; and one on behalf of Mr. Fiore, also to
the Undersigned, by letter dated January 3, 1996.

Section

H

of the collective

bargaining agreement

reads in

pertinent part:
Each grievance, in any event, shall be presented to
the other party hereto in writing, on forms adopted by
the Union and the Association.

Grievances arising

from discharges, other disciplinary action or layoffs
shall be presented within thirty (30) work days from
the time of the occurrence, or from the time such
occurrence

should

reasonably

have

become

known,

whichever is later...
In the event that a grievance relating to discharge,
other discipline or layoff is not presented within the
time limitation set forth above, such grievance shall
be deemed to have been waived by the aggrieved party
and, for all purposes, barred.
The Employer points out that four months elapsed between the
dates of the suspensions and the filing of written grievances; that that
period of time far exceeds the thirty (30) working days time limit of the
contract; and that therefore the grievances are "waived" and "barred."
Additionally and alternatively, the Employer asserts that at a
meeting on August 21st the Employer's Administrator and the Union Business
Representative

agreed

that

the

initial two

week

suspension

of the

grievants would be reduced to six days; that the Union would take no
further action and would not submit the matter to arbitration.

This

settlement, the Employer contends, was affirmed in a subsequent meeting on
August 29th with the President of the Union.

The Union contends that the contractual requirement to "present"
the grievance "to the other party" within thirty (30) working days was
satisfied by the meetings dealing with the suspensions which took place on
August 21st and August 29th and by a subsequent discussion between the
Administrator and the Business Agent on the afternoon of August 29th. And
that in any event there was a bi-lateral understanding that the Union
could wait three to four months to grieve and arbitrate.
The Union denies that any settlement was reached.

Under its

version of the meetings the Union protested the suspensions; asked for the
identity and information about purported witnesses to the events which led
to the suspension; said that the Employer's willingness to reduce the
suspensions to six days was unacceptable as a settlement; that it would
arbitrate the six day suspension; that it would give the Employer three to
four months to provide the names, statements and other information of the
"witnesses" to the events leading to the suspensions

and that if the

information was provided and was acceptable to the Union "up to the day
before the arbitration," the arbitration would be withdrawn.
From this version of the meetings, the Union concludes that the
dispute was not settled, but the parties agreed to a procedure under which
the case did not have to be officially grieved in writing or arbitrated
until the requested "witness" information was provided within three to
four months hence; and that therefore the letters to the Undersigned,
dated respectively December 18, 1995 and January 3, 1996 were in accord
with that Agreement and hence timely.
I am satisfied that there was "constructive" compliance by the
Union with the thirty (30) day time limit for filing a grievance.

Though

technically deficient because they were not in written form on an official

grievance document, I accept as adequate notice to the Employer of the
nature and details of the two grievances, the two meetings of August 21st
and August 29th.

Because those meetings followed the imposition of the

suspension by only a few days, the currency of the dispute was maintained.
The Employer was in no way prejudiced by the fact that the details of the
grievances, which were thoroughly made known to the Employer by the Union
representatives at those meetings, were not reduced to written form.
However, constructive compliance with the time limit for the
Union to present the grievances to the Employer notwithstanding, I find
that the dispute was settled at the meeting of August 21st, by persons on
both sides with authority to do so and that whatever transpired on August
29th and thereafter did not revoke or nullify that settlement.
The Employer's Administrator, Evelyn Jones testified that on
August 21st she and Union Business Agent Patricia Smith discussed what was
then a two week suspension for each grievant and negotiated a reduction in
those

suspensions

to six days.

As of the arbitration hearing, the

grievants had not served suspensions of two weeks but only six days each.
Jones testified that the reduction to six days was in consideration for
the Union's agreement not to take the issue further and not to submit it
to arbitration.
I fail to see why or how the Employer would reduce or offer to
reduce the suspension from two weeks to six days without some concession
in return.

Unless there was some quid pro quo for a shorter suspension,

what logical reason could there by for the Employer to unilaterally reduce
the originally imposed discipline?

(Especially where as here the charge

against the grievants was most serious —

namely that they "instigated,

organized and led" an illegal work stoppage).

Following the August 21st meeting the Employer implemented the
discipline —

namely a six day suspension for each grievant.

If as the

Union argues, there was no agreement on a six day suspension and the Union
had reserved the right to go to arbitration on that measure of discipline,
why would the Employer not have implemented the original penalty of a two
weeks suspension?

The logical answer is that it did not do so because

there was an agreement not just on a six day suspension but on the shorter
suspension in exchange for what Jones testified was to be "an end to the
dispute."
It is well-settled contract law that performance by one of the
parties of his part of an oral "agreement" is evidence that an agreement
consistent with that performance was made.

Here, the implementation of

the disciplinary suspension at the level of six days is probative evidence
of an agreement on that penalty.

And for there to be logic to that

implementation and that performance by the Employer, there had to be a
consideration

for

the

penalty

reduction.

I

conclude

that

that

consideration was an agreement by Business Agent Smith that the dispute
would go no further and not to arbitration.

Support for this conclusion

is found in the effort of the Employer to reduce the agreement to writing.
Unrefuted is its testimony that its memorandum of August 22nd (Employer
Exhibit #2), intended to be executed by both sides, was drafted virtually
contemporaneously with the events of August 21st.

It was not signed,

asserts the Employer, because the Union President

on August 29th in

agreeing with the resolution of August 21st, said it was therefore "not
necessary."
Because Jones and Smith had the authority to settle the dispute,
none of the events of the meeting of August 29th changed the validly and
enforceability of the August 21st understanding.

The presence of Union

President

Russo

on August

29th, I conclude, was

for the purpose of

attempting to get the six day suspension reduced to a warning.

That he

may have said that he would arbitrate the six day suspensions unless the
information about "witnesses" was forthcoming could not, in the face of an
authorized settlement on August 21st, revoke that settlement or impose a
new condition on it without mutual agreement.
Moreover,
information

on

contradictory

the

evidence

"witnesses"

and

hence

who

on the

Union's

implicated the

inconclusive.

The

alleged demand for

grievants

Union's

is sharply

claim that

the

reduction to six days was contingent on the Employer's production of that
information and the assertion that Russo would challenge the six day
suspensions unless that information was forthcoming, are denied by the
Employer.

There

is no bi-lateral written memoranda of any of those

positions that could be construed as definitive or binding.

The only

writings that refer to the request for information are internal Union
document on Union grievance forms.

As they are either undated or dated

after August 21st, they too cannot unilaterally change the bi-lateral
"deal" of August 21st.

Also, these were not sent to the Employer for any

purpose, let alone confirmation, and are consequently self serving.
It seems to me that if the reduction

of the suspension was

conditioned on the submission to the Union of the names, statements of and
other information about "witnesses," that arrangement would have been put
into writing.

Indeed,

it is such a variation from the

contractual

grievance procedure and so important in the context of the seriousness of
the change against the grievants, it should have been put in writing to be
probative.
Assuming, however, that the Union did ask for the names and the
information about "witnesses," the evidence does not show that it did so

at the meeting of August 21st.

Rather, I think it was raised after August

21st, at the next meeting of August 29th as part of the effort to get the
suspensions reduced to a warning. As such, I conclude it was a subsequent
effort by the Union to impose new conditions after a "deal" had been made
and completed on August 21st.
agreement

on

that

condition,

Again, absent clear evidence of a mutual
the

August

21st

settlement

remained

unimpeached. That Business Agent Smith, after the meeting of August 29th,
and after President Russo had left, told Ms. Jones that the Union would
give her three to four months to produce the statements of the "witnesses"
was similarly ineffective to change the agreement of August 21st.

Smith's

testimony that to that statement, Jones replied "OK Kiddo" cannot be
definitively and unambiguously interpreted, in the face of Jones' denial
and in the absence of more probative evidence of an acceptance of that
condition, as a change in what was settled on August 21st.
In short, I find that the Employer's implementation of a six day
rather than two weeks suspension; and the text, albeit unsigned, of
Employer's Exhibit 2, reflect the terms of a completed settlement reached
by Jones and Smith on August 21, 1995. The events thereafter, the meeting
of August 29th, the intervention of the Union's President, the demands for
"witness" information and the Union's effort to reserve arbitration rights
contingent on the production of that information, did not revoke, change
or impeach the verbal settlement of August 21st.
settled, they are no longer arbitrable.

As the grievances were

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following Award:
The grievances of RAYMOND BROWN and CHARLES FIORE
protesting

their

six

day

suspensions,

are

not

arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

June 12, 1996

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
,OCAL 144 S.E.I.U.

OPINION AND AWARD

and
SEA CREST HEALTH CARE CENTER

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Home wrongfully fail or refuse to offer fulltime work to the grievant?

If so, what shall be the

remedy?
A hearing was held on January 22, 1996 at which time the
grievant, GARY DIEUDONNE and representatives of the above-named Union and
Home appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The pertinent contract clauses are as follows:
E.

Promotions within the bargaining unit shall be upon the
basis of skill, ability and qualifications. When these are
reasonably equal, seniority shall prevail.

F.

When positions become available, they shall be filled as
follows:
1.

Regularly employed part-time workers shall first
be offered additional or full-time work in their
classification,

as

such

positions

become

available, in accordance with seniority.
The grievant is a part-time dietary aide.

The Home by-passed

him and appointed junior part-time dietary aides to full-time positions in
that classification.

The Home did not offer a full-time dietary aide job to the
grievant

because

of

his

poor

attendance

record

which

included 78

latenesses during the one-year period June 1994 to June 1995 and a large
number of absences, usually on week-end days, with attendant disciplinary
notations over the period April 1993 to November 1995.

The Home deemed

this record as rendering the grievant unreliable and hence unqualified for
a full-time assignment.

The Home asserts that to grant him a full-time

job, considering his poor attendance record, would "severely harm the
operation of the Home."
Contractually, the Home argues that a change from part-time to
full-time employment is a "promotion" within the meaning of Section E of
the contract,

and that attendance is a relevant factor in assessing

"qualifications" thereunder.
The Union's position is that only Section F(l) of the contract
is relevant and applicable.
consideration

It asserts that "seniority" is the only

in offering full-time employment to incumbent part-time

employees; that the grievant enjoyed the requisite higher seniority and
was in a part-time classification for which there was a full-time opening.
On an equitable basis, the grievant is not entitled to a fulltime assignment.

But on a contractual basis he is.

It is well-settled

that where a specific contract provision and equitable considerations are
in conflict, the former is pre-eminent.
Here the Home had grounds to discipline the grievant for his
poor attendance record.

Indeed, his attendance appears to have been so

unsatisfactory his discharge would have been warranted.

But the Home did

not discharge him. He remained employed and I find contractually eligible
for a full-time assignment in his classification as a dietary aide.

The foregoing conclusion is based on my view that movement from
a part-time dietary aide to a full-time dietary aide is not a "promotion"
within

the meaning of Section E of the contract.

Traditionally, a

"promotion" under a collective bargaining agreement is from a lesser
classification to a higher classification.
supportive.

The dictionary definition is

"Promotion" is defined as "advancement or raise in rank or

responsibility"

or "to raise to a more important or responsible job"

(emphasis added).
Here the grievant would not have been raised or advanced in
rank.

He would have remained in his same classification —

dietary aide.

He would not have assumed duties that were more responsible.

He would

lave performed the same duties as before, albeit for a larger period of
time, either daily or weekly.

I am not persuaded that a lengthening of

the same duties constitutes a "raise in responsibilities or importance."
Moreover, if Section E was intended to cover movements from
part-time to full-time employment within the same classification, Section
F(l) would be largely redundant and unnecessary.

I am satisfied that

Section F(l) was negotiated for a purpose different from Section E.
not

only

distinguishes

movement to

full-time from part-time

It

from a

"promotion," and not only gives priority for full-time appointments to
part-time incumbents, but sets up a single qualification for that movement
—

seniority.

Obviously, "gualification" to perform the full-time job is

not a factor under Section F(l) because the movement is within the job
lassification the employee already occupies.
has demonstrated

Presumably, therefore, he

his ability or qualifications to perform the duties

because he has done so as a part-timer.

Here, if the Home considerd his

attendance record as bearing in his qualifications, it could have and
should have asserted that position by disciplining him while he worked as
a dietary aide part-time.

In short, it is not relevant under Section

The grievant, still employed as a part-time dietary aide despite
his poor attendance record, enjoyed greater seniority that that of those
part-time

dietary

aides

who

were

granted

full-time

jobs

in

that

classification. The grievant met the contractual qualification of Section
F(l) , namely his greater seniority, and therefore was entitled to the
full-time opportunity before employees junior to him.

Though entitled to

the full-time opening he remains subject to discipline for his poor
attendance record, and in my view, would be subject to discharge if that
record does not improve to a satisfactory level.
Recognizing this latter fact, I will not award the grievant any
back pay or other retroactive benefits along with my order granting him
the full-time appointment.

My reason for not doing so is that I cannot

tell what his attendance record would have been had his application for
the full-time job been granted.

In other words, I consider it quite

possible that even if he had been given the full-time job, his attendance
might well have remained unreliable and unsatisfactory.
tenure

in the full-time

absences and latenesses.

And therefore his

job may have been short-lived or marred by
Hence, to make him whole is too speculative and

nence inappropriate.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following Award:

The Home wrongfully failed or refused to offer fulltime work to the grievant, GARY DIEUDONNE.
He shall be offered full-time work as a dietary aide.
There shall be no back

pay or other retroactive

benefits.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

February 9, 1996

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 470, INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
ELECTRONIC, ELECTRICAL, SALARIED
MACHINE AND FURNITURE WORKERS

CASE #133000085095

and
SPERRY ASSOCIATION FEDERAL CREDIT
UNION
-X

The parties did not stipulate an issue.

Based on the

record before me I deem the issue to be:
What shall be the financial basis for "other
plans

or

arrangements

benefits

at

that

comparable

can

cost"

provide
for

the

bargaining unit employees of the Credit Union
following
continue
plans,

the

decision

administering

and

following

of

Unisys

the

various

benefit

failure

of

the

not

to

the

Credit Union and Local 470 I.U.E. to reach an
agreement

on

such

"other

plans

and

arrangements."
A hearing was held on October

17, 1995 at which time

representatives of the Sperry Association Federal Credit Union,

hereinafter referred to as the Employer, and Local 470 I.U.E.,
hereinafter referred to as the "Union" appeared.

All concerned

were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and
to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived; a stenographic record of the hearing was taken; and the
Union and Employer filed post-hearing briefs.
Article

14

Section

B

of

the

Collective

Bargaining

Agreement reads:
1.

The provisions for Group Life Insurance, Accident
and

Health

Insurance

and

Hospitalization

Surgical Benefits, etc., and for the

and

retirement

pension plan shall be those in effect between the
Sponsor and Local 470 for its Salaried Unit at the
time of the execution of this agreement, as long as
the

Sponsor

permits

continued

participation of

Credit Union employees in the Sponsor's respective
plans.
2.

Benefit accruals stop at age 70.

The term "Sponsor" refers to Unisys Corporation as
the

operator

of

its

current

facility

at

Lake

Success, NY or such successor at the same location
as

undertakes

full

responsibility

for

all

the

obligations of a sponsor of a federal credit union
and continues to administer its benefit plans in
the

same or

comparable manner with

respect

to

benefit plans covered by this Article.
3.

In

the

event

the

Sponsor

cannot

or

will

not

administer the benefit plans to provide coverage of
employees under this contract, as heretofore, the

parties will meet to discuss the establishment of
other

plans

benefits

at

or

arrangements

comparable

cost

that
to

can
the

provide
employer.

Failing agreement on such plans within 30 days of
the initiation of negotiation, either party may
submit the matter to final and binding arbitration
in accordance with the procedures of the American
Arbitration

Association.

The parties

will use

their best efforts to prevent any interruption of
benefits.
The critical part of the dispute is narrow.

It centers

on the meaning of "comparable cost" in paragraph 3 above.
The Employer's position is that on the aggregate its
payments to Unisys for administration of the various benefit plans1
for its fourteen or so bargaining unit employees, was 20% of
payroll.

It asserts that 20% of payroll is the definition of

"comparable cost" for any new set of benefit plans, replacing the
plans that Unisys decided to no longer administer.2
The Union contends that 20% or 21% of payroll does not
provide the employees with the benefits they enjoyed under the
Unisys

administration;

that

under

protest,

pending

this

arbitration, the bargaining unit employees have been required to
pay significantly greater employee contributions to support the
benefits; that based on "comparable cost" the Employer should be

'Health Insurance; Pension; Life Insurance; 401(K) Plan;
Dental and Long Term Disability; Cafeteria Plan.
2The Employer is prepared to commit 21% to new benefit
plans.

required

to pay more than 20% or 21% because the cost of the

benefits under the Unisys plans were higher; and that if required
to pay those actual costs, the employees' contributions would be
unnecessary and eliminated.
The Union asks for a variety of remedies, including inter
alia an order directing the Employer to "pay the full amounts for
all premiums," to "adopt or sponsor a defined benefit pension plan;
to provide life insurance...equal to two times of annual salary;
"to credit employees for premiums deducted from their pay checks
since July 1, 1995"; "to sponsor or adopt a cafeteria plan"; "to
adopt A 401(K) plan when such plan is legal"; "to provide long-term
disability and dental coverage, when feasible..."
I conclude that the exercise of my authority, at least at
this point, under Article 14 Section B(3) of the contract is to
rule on the meaning of "comparable cost"; to afford the parties
thereafter an opportunity to negotiate and agree upon what plans
and benefits can be established within the defined "comparable
cost" and to make whatever reimbursements to employees for premiums
paid or expenses incurred which otherwise would have been covered
by the plan(s); and for me to retain jurisdiction over the entire
case

for,

if

necessary,

rulings

on

the

application

and

interpretation of my decision on "comparable cost" and to resolve
substantive

disputes

parties cannot agree.

over the plans to be established

if the

In short, I believe that with a definition of "comparable
cost" and with that disagreement resolved the parties can and
should

return

to

negotiations

and

should

be

able

to

reach

substantive agreements.
In defining "comparable cost," I reject the Employer's
contention that it is an aggregate percentage of payroll.

Each

benefit plan has a particular cost for the benefits it provides.
Therefore "comparable cost" should in my view be a series of costs,
each connected to and identified with a particular plan and the
benefits thereunder.
of

pensions;

the

Hence, the cost of health insurance; the cost

cost

of

dental coverage,

the

insurance, etc. should be determined separately.
total thereof

cost

of

life

Of course, the

is the total cost available to the parties for

negotiated allocation to whatever plans they establish and whatever
levels of benefit attach to those plans.

Again in short, the

separate "comparable cost" determinations of each of the prior
benefit plans will give the parties a cumulative financial figure
with which they can deal for allocation.
Also, I reject the Union's assertion that "comparable
cost" is a guarantee of a continued level of benefits previously
enjoyed under the Unisys administration.

It is apparent to me that

because the Unisys plans covered some 14,000 employees of Unisys as
well as the 14 employees of the Employer involved in this case, a
better deal on a level of benefits for those 14 was

obtained because of the overall large enrollments.

So "comparable

cost" does not include a guarantee of the same level of benefits as
before for the fourteen or so bargaining unit employees in this
case.
What then is "comparable cost"?
should

be

given

their

It is well-settled that

ordinary

words

meaning.

I consider "comparable cost" to be subject to that rule.
The dictionary defines "cost"

required

in

payment

for

a

purchase"

ordinary

and

customary

as "an amount paid or
(emphasis

added).

The

definition of "comparable" is "similar or equivalent."3
Based on there definitions, I conclude that "comparable
cost" is what was paid or required to be paid for the particular
benefits at issue in this case, and that the amount is similar or
equivalent what was paid to purchase that benefit under the Unisys
administration.
It follows that with this definition, the Employer is
wrong when he asserts that "comparable cost" is 20% of payroll
unless that 20% has been the full payment of the Employer's share
of the cost of the premiums for the particular benefits for the 14
covered employees.

Put another way, only if the 20% plus the

original employee's contribution is equal to the actual, full cost
of the premiums, would that percentage equate to "comparable cost."

3The

American Heritage Dictionary

But the record shows that 20% did not rise to that level,
and that 20% was not enough to "purchase" the benefits.

Instead,

apparently, 20% of payroll was what the Employer paid to Unisys for
the plans, but Unisys, either based on the 14,000 enrollees or on
a per capita breakdown for the instant grievants, paid premiums to
the insurance carrier(s) or to the benefit funds (if self insured)
that cost more than 20% of payroll.

The evidence adduced at the

hearing revealed that the difference between 20% and the actual
cost of the Employer's share of the premium(s) was subsidized,
absorbed or otherwise covered by Unisys.
In other words, the cost to this Employer, which he
measures at 20% was not the cost of paying for or purchasing the
benefits for the 14 bargaining unit employees.

The actual cost was

more, and Unisys took care of the difference.
I find, therefore, that "comparable cost" within the
meaning of Article

14 Section B(3) was not what

it cost the

Employer (i.e. the 20%) and, therefore, not the 20% of payroll that
the Employer paid to Unisys but rather the amount that Unisys paid
to the carrier (s) or to an insured fund (or to a self-insured plan)
to purchase the various benefits.
This interpretation is not only supported by dictionary
definition

and

by ordinary

logic, but

by the history

negotiations of Article 14 Section B of the contract.

of the

I accept as

accurate the Union's testimony that at no time until this dispute
arose, did the Employer disclose that its contribution was 20% of
payroll and that there was subsidization from Unisys.

Absent such

disclosure at negotiations, and considering the unusual nature of
that financial arrangement between the Employer and Unisys I think

it fully reasonable that the Union believed that the Employer was
paying the full amount of the premium(s) less the employees' then
contributions.

So, I find no basis to apply the principle of

estoppel to the Union's claim herein.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
1.

The

Employer's

position

that

"comparable

cost"

equates to 20% or 21% of payable, is rejected.
2.

The Union's claim that "comparable cost" equates to
a guarantee of the same benefits enjoyed under the
Unisys administered benefit plans, is rejected.

3.

The term "comparable cost"
B(3) of the contract

in Article 4 Section

is the full amount of the

premium (s) paid by Unisys to the carriers

or a

benefit fund for each benefit plan for and covering
the instant bargaining unit employees

just prior

to its discontinuance of its administration.

By

"full amount" I mean the total payment for the
purchase of each plan and its benefits for those
employees,

less,

of

course,

the

employee

contributions, if any, then in place.
4.

Based on the record it appears that a calculation
of the above sums of payment will be in excess of
20% or 21% of the payroll of the bargaining unit
employees of the Employer, whether calculated on a
benefit-by-benefit

plan

basis,

or

cumulatively.

The making of the precise calculations, I leave to
the parties.
5.

With the foregoing definition of "comparable cost,"
I direct the parties to resume negotiations on what
types of benefit plans they wish to establish, the
level of benefits of those plans, and whether any
employee is entitled to any reimbursements.

6.

I

shall

retain

jurisdiction

to

resolve

disagreements over the application, interpretation
and implementation of this AWARD.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

January 15, 1996

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA -ANDWHITE PLAINS BUS COMPANY
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA

OPINION AND AWARD

and
WHITE PLAINS BUS COMPANY

The stipulated issue is:
Was

there

LAWSON?

just cause for the discharge of CAROL

If not, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on September 18, 1996 at which time Ms.
awson, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The grievant was discharged on August 9, 1996 for what the
Company

characterizes

as three incidents of insubordination.

Those

alleged incidents occurred on January 17th, March 7th and August 2/3,
1996.

On January 17th a snow storm was in progress.

The Elmsford and

White Plains schools serviced by the Company closed early. The grievant's
regular work assignment was to transport school children to and from
certain Elmsford schools and to and from one White Plains kindergarten.
On a normal day she would complete her work assignment at about 3:45 P.M.
On January 17th, because of the snow storm and the early closing, she
completed her regular assignment sometime shortly after 11:00 A.M.

Soon after 11:00 A.M., Dispatcher, Robert Tramontino instructed
the grievant to pick up school children at a certain middle school in
White Plains because additional buses were needed to handle the early
closing of the White Plains schools.

That proposed assignment was not

jart of the grievant's regular work schedule.
The Company asserts that the grievant refused to comply with
that assignment.

It states that she told the dispatcher that she "had

enough for the day" and was "going home."

In response to the dispatcher's

explanation that the Company "had its back to the wall" and needed more
buses to handle the early White Plains school closings, the grievant
stated that she "had been up and down Payne Street hill and had enough."
When asked directly if she was "refusing the assignment," the Company
states that the grievant replied "yes."

The dispatcher then removed her

from service.
The grievant's position is that she had no obligation to take on
an extra assignment beyond her regular "pick."

She also claims that the

roads were icy and dangerous, especially Payne hill, and that she was not
required to expose herself to any further risks.
On March 17th, the Company asserts that the grievant loudly and
angrily directed disrespectful, obscene and insulting language at Head
Dispatcher, Joseph Costable in the presence of other supervisory and
aargaining unit employees. And that when asked by Costable to "calm down"
the

grievant

became

increasingly

loud,

again directing

profane and

insulting language at Costable, and called him "a fucking ass hole."

This

incident apparently arose from frustration the grievant experienced when

unable to "gas up" her bus.

A van, driven by another employee had been

parked at and blocked the gas tank and was left there by its driver,
unattended.

The grievant asserts

that the van driver has regularly

received preferential treatment; that to leave the van so parked violated
Company rules; and that her anger was therefore justified.

However, she

denies

language

that

she

directed

disrespectful

and/or

profane

at

Costablef asserting instead that her outbursts was about the circumstances
generally and were directed at no one in particular.
On August 2nd, Safety Supervisor, Richard Lente, filling in for
Costable, had an encounter with the grievant regarding the assignment of
a particular bus.

He instructed her to ascertain whether certain repairs

on that bus (Bus #258) had been made and whether it was clean.

Lente

asserts that the grievant first refused to check on the repairs; said that
she would not take that bus because it smelled; and that the assignment of
that bus to her was "bullshit."
Ultimately, the grievant made her run with Bus #258, but the
charge against her for that particular day was that she was disrespectful
and insulting to supervision and defiant.
The events of August 2nd are, in the Company's view, melded in
to the events of the very next day, August 3rd, heightening the allegation
of insubordination and triggering the grievant's dismissal.
On August 3rd, she was assigned Bus #623.
#620 and that request was granted.

She asked for Bus

However, she then rejected Bus #620

claiming that it "smelled of chicken."

She asked for Bus #88 but was told

that it was not available because it was not owned by the Company.
told her to "do the charter with Bus #620."
grievant then "gave him the finger."

Lente

Lente claims that the

That particular act was reported by

Lente to higher management and precipitated the grievant's discharge.

The grievant asserts that she did nothing of an insulting nature
on

August

2nd.

And

that

on August

3rd, she

denies

"the

finger"

accusation, asserting in her testimony at the hearing that she "does not
enow what giving the finger means."
I find no reason in record why three different supervisors would
falsify their testimony.
events as accurate.

Therefore, I accept their versions of the three

I also conclude that Costable knows the difference

between obscenities that are "shop talk" or common place in a work office
and those that are directed specifically at a supervisory employee and
lence are insulting, abusive and insubordinate.

I find that on March 7th

the grievant's conduct was directed offensively at Costable; that her
language of vilification was directed at and about him.

That it may have

been prompted by the improper manner that the van and its operator blocked
the gas tanks is only an explanation but it is not an acceptable excuse
for

the

grievant's

intemperate

and

abusive

outbursts

against

the

dispatcher.
I do not believe the grievant when she asserts her innocence
over what
working

"giving the finger" means.

environment,

adults

know

of

Realistically, in this modern
this

gesture

and

its meaning.

Therefore, I reject as untrue her denial of the account and accept as
truthful the supervisors' report.
The grievant is wrong in her defense that she was not obligated
to carry out the extra assignment to pick up children at the White Plains
school during the snow storm of January 7th.
regular work assignment is immaterial.
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That it was not part of her

If there is any arbitral rule that

is universally well-settled it is that employees must carry out orders of
management, even if they think those orders are wrong or, as here, outside
of a regular work schedule.

The rule is "to comply and then grieve."

The

grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract are the remedy for
and

are

improper.

fully

capable

of redressing

an order or directive

that is

The only exceptions to that rule are not applicable here.

If

the order is illegal or realistically

dangerous beyond an employee's

recognized duties, it may be declined.

But here, the directive to get

children at the White Plains schools was certainly lawful.

It was not

dangerous to the "life or limb" of the grievant beyond her job duties
aecause driving
driver's job.

in the snow is an anticipated part of a school bus

And, more significantly, there is no evidence that the snow

storm had progressed to a dangerous level.

Indeed, the early closings of

the schools was to preclude that possibility.

Moreover, her explanation

that she had been up and down Payne hill all day is irrelevant because the
unrefuted evidence is that the routes to and from the White Plains middle
school did not include travelling on Payne hill.
In short, the grievant's conduct on those three occasions, and
certainly cumulatively, rose to a level of impermissible defiance and
hence was insubordinate.
Nonetheless, though insubordination is an offense justifying
summary dismissal without the application of prior progressive discipline,
I have decided to use this case for instructional

purposes

grievant and for all other employees as may be appropriate.
it to have that

broad based instructional

grievant one final chance to behave properly.

for the

In order for

effect, I shall give the

I do so in small part because of the grievant's seniority but
primarily because

(and hence its instructional purpose)

I believe it

possible that the grievant does not know or understand what type of
conduct is expected of her and what the relationship should be between
herself and supervision.
erroneously

thinks

that

Put another way, I discern that the grievant
an adversarial, confrontational

attitude in her dealings with supervisors
employee/employer relationship.

and abusive

is normal to a traditional

If that is their belief, as evidenced by

the circumstances of this case, she is not only manifestly wrong but on
those erroneous premises she has placed her job security in jeopardy.
Bargaining unit employees are entitled to the respect of and
civility from supervisory employees.
true.
a

duty

And clearly the reverse is equally

Additionally, and also universally well-settled, the employee has
to

obey

supervisory

and managerial instructions.

Absent a

requirement of obedience, essential discipline and managerial authority to
direct an employer's mission are undermined, resulting ultimately, in
'industrial anarchy."

Therefore

any improper orders to or improper

treatment of bargaining unit employees may and must be referred to the
grievance procedure

of the contract which is designed for and fully

capable of redressing any such wrongs.
I agree with the Company's assertion that she did not "get it"
when efforts were made to impress the grievant with the unacceptable
nature of her conduct.

A glaring example of "not getting it" is her

refusal to carry out the assignment on January 7th to pick up children at
the White Plains middle school.

Her argument in this proceeding that she

is not obligated to do any work outside her regular route, is so wrong as

a matter of arbitral law and so incongruous with what is required in an
employee/employer relationship, that it supports the conclusion not simply
that she was defiant and insubordinate, but arguable, that she did not
know the rule of conduct involved.
instructional purposes
this Collective

For these reasons, and again for

(as the relatively new Impartial Chairman under

Bargaining

relationship), I shall give her one more

chance, not only to become aware of what the Company has been telling her
but now of what the Impartial Chairman is also telling her.

If she heeds

my admonition and performs her work properly and successfully, this last
chance will have succeeded and she will stay at work.

If, however, she

commits any further disciplinary offenses, I would consider that and those
to be grounds for summary dismissal and would so rule in any subsequent
proceedings before me.
Finally, let the instant enunciation of the foregoing rules
regarding insubordination be notice to all employees who may harbor the
same or similar erroneous views of the grievant.
those

views

confrontational

and

attitudes
and/or

are

wrong

disrespectful

and

Let it be known that
if

attitude

employed
in

(i.e.

dealing

a

with

supervision), a penalty of discharge will be upheld.
The

Undersigned,

Impartial

Chairman

under

the

Collective

Bargaining Agreement between the above-named parties, and having duly
leard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the following
AWARD:

The

discharge

of

CAROL

LAWSON

disciplinary suspension.

is

reduced

to

a

One month from the day of

this Award she shall be offered reinstatement by the
Company.
grievant,
sternly

Said reinstatement,

if accepted

shall be without any back pay.
warned

that

if

she

commits

disciplinary offenses, a penalty

by the
She is

any

future

of discharge, if

imposed on her by the Company, will be upheld.

Eric J. Schmertz, Impartial Chairman

DATED:

October 16, 1996

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss:
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
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IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
COMMUNICATIONS WORKERS OF AMERICA

OPINION AND AWARD

-andBELLSOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS, INC.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Whether

the

collective

Company

violated

bargaining

the

agreement

relating to vacation treatment for
part-time

employees

being

reclassified to full time?
A hearing was held on April 4, 1997 in Birmingham, Alabama, at
which

time

appeared.

representatives
All

concerned

of
were

the

above-named

afforded

full

Union

and

opportunity

Company
to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived; a stenographic record was taken; and the
parties filed post-hearing briefs.

More

specifically,

this matter involves

fifteen computer

attendants who on August 27, 1995 were reclassified from regular parttime status to regular full-time status.
Vacation entitlement is measured beginning on January 1st of
a

given year.

undisputed

From

that

the

January
grievants

1, 1995
properly

to August
accrued

27,

1995

vacation

it is

pay

and

entitlement computed on their part-time employment of 15 hours of work
per week.

(The full-time work week is 37.5 hours).
After

August

27,

1995,

in

accordance

with

a

Company

Agreement Interpretation and practice, the Company made no change in
the

treatment

of

the grievants

for vacations, continuing

for the

balance of the year the accrual of vacation entitlements on a parttime basis.
The Union contends that when the grievants became full-time
employees they were entitled to the calculation of vacation benefits
on the basis of a full 37.5 hours of work each week.

And that if that

was done, the grievants would have enjoyed, for whatever vacation time
remained to them increased vacation entitlements, based on the fulltime calculations.
The Union

relies entirely on certain contract

provisions

which it asserts lead to a conclusion that the grievance should be
granted.

First,

inversely,

the Union points out that there is no

provision in the contract which allows the Company to deny full-time
vacation benefits to employees re-classified full-time.
Next, it cites Article 5, Section 5.06, which, in substance,
quantities

the

amount

of

vacation

pay

seniority, without other limitations.

and

entitlement

based

on

From that the Union argues that

when the grievants achieved full-time seniority, they were entitled to
full-time vacation pay and entitlements.
The Union cites Article 2, Section 2.01, and particularly
Paragraphs B. 2, 3 and 4, thereof.

It asserts that because part-time

employees shall receive
"The

rate

increase.

of

pay

and

amount

of

. .prorated by relating

his/her hours of work to the normal
work week."
and that
"A part-time employee shall receive
progression increases

at the same

intervals as full-time employees."
the parties
timers

recognized

became

employee."

contractually

effective

And

"at

the

that pay

same

that the same should

increases

intervals

as

a

apply to increased

benefits when a part-time employee becomes full-time.

for partfull-time
vacation

In other words,

because there is no hiatus between the date of a pay increase and its
effectiveness, there should be no hiatus in the application of fulltime vacation benefits after an employee becomes full-time.

Indeed,

the Union asserts that vacation pay is a form of wages, and should be
treated similarly.
B-4 provides for a review of part-time employees on April 1
and October 1 of each year (for pay adjustments).

The Union contends

that for the Company not to grant vacation benefit adjustments on and
after August 27th for those prior part-timers who became full-time on
that

date

is violative of the principle

coincide with negotiated

of adjusting

benefits to

improvements and those contractual

review

dates.
The Union cites Article 1, Section 1.25, Paragraph C which
provides in pertinent part:
Part-time

employees

and

full-time

employees. . .who are subsequently
reclassified
accrue
basis

to

seniority

part-time
on

will

a

pro-rated

as such proration

shall be

determined by the number of hours
worked

per

week as a percent of

37.5 hours. . ."
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From that the Union argues that if seniority is "prorated"
upon

reclassification,

then vacation benefits should

similarly be

prorated based on full-time status, on and after an employee changes
from part-time to full-time.
The Union's theory

is similar with

contractual language for holiday pay.

its citation of the

It cites Article 4, Section

4.03 which in substance provides that:
"The holiday allowance paid shall
be

prorated

relationship
part-time

based
of

on

the

the

individual

employee's

'part-time

equivalent work week' to the normal
work week of a comparable full-time
employee . . . "
From this, the Union submits that if holiday allowances are
prorated, the same should be true for vacation benefits.

And that if

a part-timers' holiday pay is prorated without any calendar cut-off
dates, it is contractually logical, if not mandated that full-time
vacation benefits become effective for the percentage of the vacation
year remaining on and after a part-timer becomes full-time.

In

short,

the Union

asserts

that because

pay benefits,

seniority benefits and holiday benefits, among others, are acquired by
employees on the date they achieve the requisite seniority or when
contractually effective, without any calendar hiatus, the same should
obtain to vacation benefits.
achieved

full-time

status

And that therefore, when the grievants
and

seniority,

the

full-time

vacation

benefits should attach prospectively without any delays for any or all
of the employee's remaining vacation time.
The Company

asserts

that none

of the foregoing

contract

provisions relate to or cover the instant circumstance - namely the
reclassification of part-timers to full-time.
It points out that there is no express contract provision or
language

that addresses

this fact situation, and that it was not

raised by either side in contract negotiations.
therefore

that

there

was

no

"meeting of

the

The Company concludes
minds"

and

that

it

remains, therefore, a managerial right to be dealt with by the Company
unilaterally,

provided the arrangements the Company promulgates are

fair and reasonable.
The

Company

contends

that

its

arrangement

under

these

circumstances is logical, fair, and reasonable as well as supported by
uncontested past practice.

More specifically, the Company has interpreted its contract
obligations regarding vacation benefits for part-timers reclassified
to

full-time on essentially an equitable basis.

employee

was

reclassified

on

a before

July

1st

If the affected
(i.e. before

the

expiration of 6 months of the vacation year) he was accorded vacation
benefits

of whatever

employee basis.

remained

of his vacation time on a full-time

But if the reclassification took place after July

1st, (i.e. within the last 6 months of the vacation year) the affected
employee would continue to receive vacation benefits on a part-time
basis.
The
reasonable,

Company

views the July

especially

providing otherwise.

in

the

1st cutoff date as

absence

of

any

contract

fair and
language

It argues that it is manifestly fair to accord

full-time vacation benefits to employees who have worked at least % of
the vacation year as full-timers, and to deny it to those who (like
the grievants in this case) remained part-timers for more than M of
the vacation year.
The Company argues that what the Union seeks would lead to
inequities and unfair results.

It points out that if a part-timer is

reclassified full-time in December, and had not yet taken any vacation
time, his full vacation entitlement, generated by the single month he
was in full-time status would be at the full-time rate.
would be an unfair "windfall."

And that

Similarly, the Company claims that

under

the

Union's

theory,

if,

in

the

reverse,

full-timers

are

reclassified to part-time, their vacation entitlements should be cut
appropriately.

Not only has the Company not done so and does not plan

to do so, but explains that that would be unfair to the employee.
concludes

the

Company,

the

fair,

equitable

and

more

So,

easily

administered procedure was to adopt and implement the "one-half" year
formula, with

the July

1st cut-off date,

for part-timers becoming

full-time, and to leave the reverse unaffected.
Finally,

the Company

relies on past practice.

It cited

examples of some situations where it applied the "half-year" formula
without objection from the affected employee(s) or the Union.
past practice, the Company asserts, is evidence of the

This

reasonableness

of its exercise of managerial rights in this regard and the fairness
of the formula applied, and that the Arbitrator should not legislate a
different

arrangement.

A

change,

collective bargaining not arbitration.

concludes

the

Company

is

for

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
BETWEEN

AWARD AND OPINION

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF ELECTRONIC,
ELECTRICAL, SALARIED, MACHINE AND
FURNITURE WORKERS, LOCAL 767 AFL-CIO

CASE # 113000022197

-AND-

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Did the grievant, Bruce Montgomery, have
the
minimum
qualifications
required
under the provisions of
Section 1 of
Article XXVIII of the contract to be
upgraded
to
the
Cell Leader R-21
position in March 1996?
If the Arbitrator determines that the
grievant
did
have
the
minimum
qualifications
required
for
such
upgrading,
did the Company violate
Article XXVIII when it upgraded John
Withers pursuant to the March 1996
posting rather than the grievant?
If
so, what shall the remedy be?

A hearing was held on May 15, 1997 in Somerset, Kentucky at
which time the grievant and representatives of the above-named Union

and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer

argument

evidence

witnesses.

and

and

to

examine

and

cross-examine

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived, a stenographic record

was taken and both the Union and the Company

filed a post-hearing

brief.
The pertinent part of Section 1 of Article XXVIII provides:
1.

Standard for filing open jobs and upgrading.
The Company will, to the extent
practical, give first consideration
for job openings and upgrading to
present employees when employees
with the necessary qualifications
are
available.
In
upgrading
employees to higher rated jobs, the
Company
will
take
into
consideration
as
an
important
factor
the
relative
length of
seniority of the employees who it
finds
are
qualified
for
such
upgrading..."

The Company determined that the grievant was not qualified
and that, therefore, his greater seniority than that of John Withers
was irrelevant.
To be minimally qualified for the Cell Leaders
Company

had

qualified

three

press

requirements.

operator.

First,

Second,

that

that
the

the

job, the

applicant

applicant

experience operating multiple presses as a press operator.

have

be a
had

And third

that the applicant have a record of top or near top productivity on
his press, gauged against his peers.

The Company asserts that the grievant met only the
first requirement.
operator.

It acknowledges that he is a qualified press

(exclusively on Press #3).
But it asserts he had not operated any of the other

presses as a press operator, and that his productivity on Press #3
was at the bottom or near the bottom of the productivity of his
peer operators.
Standing alone, the three requirements by the Company
are relevant to the Cell Leader job, reasonable as threshold qualifications and if required of all applicants, non-discriminatory.
Qualification as a press operator is obvious and
undisputed.

Experience on more than one press is justified by the

fact that the Leader will be expected to provide trouble-shooting
assistance to other press operators and to assign work in the production of glass products.

And a top level of productivity is not an

unreasonable or irrelevant requirement of a job that does or will
carry with it "leadership duties."

The job posting describes

the Cell Leader as "an employee who has been officially assigned
by the Operators Manager, to direct the activities of, and be
responsible for the work of a definite group of employees, who in
turn have been instructed by the Plant Manager to accept this
team leader's direction."
However, no matter how reasonable and relevant those three
requirements may be standing alone, they become unreasonable or
inapplicable if not adequately noticed as part of the job
(1) Because it plans to do so as soon as the Cell Leaders are all in place, the
fact that it has not yet implemented the leadership role of the Cell Leader does not
negate the requirement of the leadership ability.

- 3-

requirements, or if inconsistent with the job posting, or if, as a
threshold

standard,

an applicant does not know

of the requirement

because it has not been communicated to him in time to give him a
reasonable opportunity to meet it.
In this case, and limited to the particular facts herein, I
find that the Company erred when it determined that the grievant did
not have experience operating multiple presses.

And that it waived or

ineffectively set forth as a qualification, the requirement of "top"
or "near top" productivity.
The posting for the Cell Leader job in question is itself an
important

and

determinative

requirements for upgrading.

piece

of

evidence

in

deciding

job

It serves to notify potential bidders of

the minimum qualifications required.

In pertinent part, the fifth

paragraph thereof reads:
Potential applicants should have at
least 5 to 10 years of familiarity with
Pressing Operations on a number of
different presses coupled with a recent
assignment in the press area (3 years).
(Emphasis added)
There is no dispute that the grievant met the
longevity requirements.

foregoing

But,

the

Company's

requirement

qualified an applicant must have worked

that

to

be

minimally

on multiple presses

as a

qualified press operator, exceeds, is more demanding than and hence
inconsistent with the requirements set forth in the posting.
The posting
operations.

requires only

"familiarization" with pressing

Defined by the dictionary, "familiarization" is:

"Having a fair knowledge of something."
"To

be

acquainted

with..." (American

or

Heritage

conversant
Dictionary)

(Random House Dictionary of the English
language).
Based on my authorized observation of the pressing operation
together with the grievant's acknowledged experience as a qualified
operator on Press #3, and his undisputed earlier experience on several
of

the

other

presses

as

a

shift

attendant filling

in

for

press

operators when they are out, I conclude that the grievant met the
requirement of
the posting.

"familiarization" within the meaning of that term and
Indeed, unrefuted in the record is evidence not only of

the grievant's overall "fill-in" activity on several presses but that
for many weeks he filled in on Press #7 and ran it alone as the
de facto operator while the regular operator was out.
I conclude, to meet a minimum qualification.

That is enough,

For, in determining minimum qualifications, I hold that the
Company is bound by the language of is posting, particularly in the
absence of an explicit requirement of multi-press experience in the
press

operator

classification.

Accordingly,

I deem

the

grievant

sufficiently familiar with press operations to be minimally qualified.
The third requirement "top or near top" productivity - was
inadequately and ineffectively applied to this particular upgrading.
It is not part of the posting, either expressly or impliedly.
that

regard

standard.

the

applicants

were

not

informed

of

that

So, in

threshold

More significant to my mind is the apparent fact that in no

other way was the grievant notified of this requirement before full
implementation of the bidding and selection process. Nor, because of
the lack of notice thereof, given a chance to improve his productivity
or take steps to comply with the standard.

Indeed, the record shows

that the first time the grievant knew or was told of that requirement
was

not

indicates

until
that

qualifications

his
on
were

bid

had

earlier
not

been

rejected.

similar

considered

In

fact,

bids,

when

his

because

of

his

the

record

substantive
then

lesser

seniority, he was not told or otherwise notified about the "top or
near top" productivity requirement and therefore could not ancitipate

it as a requirement for later bids, including the instant bid.
as

I

have

previously

said,

productivity requirement
qualifications

for

standing

a bonafide

alone

standard

a Cell Leader.

But

I

would

find

in determining

here,

in the

Again,
the

minimum

absence of

adequate and timely notice to the grievant, leaving him unable to
explain or improve his productivity in anticipation of making the bid;
in the absence of its listing in the posting and in view of what
appears to be its ex post facto application by the Company, I find it
unfair and unreasonable to make it a minimum qualification.
Again resorting

to the dictionary, the word

"minimum" is

defined as:
"the

least

possible."
Applying
"minimum

quantity

or

amount

(emphasis added)
this

qualifications,"

definition
together

to

the

with the

critical

contract

foregoing

term

findings,

I

conclude that though the grievant may not have been fully qualified,
or even well qualified, he was minimally qualified.
That being so, I find no reason why the grievant's greater
seniority

should not have been the determining factor in making the

upgrading selection in accordance with Article XXVIII.

The
having

duly

Undersigned,
heard

the

duly

proofs

designated
and

as

allegations

the Arbitrator,
of

the

and

above-named

parties, makes the following AWARD:
The grievant, Bruce Montgomery had
the
minimum
qualifications
effectively
required
under
the
provisions of Section 1 of Article
XXVIII
of the contract to be
upgraded to the Cell Leader R-21
position in March 1996.
The Company violated Article XXVIII
when
it
upgraded
John
Wither/
pursuant to the March 1996 posting
rather than the grievant.
The
Company is directed to upgrade the
grievant to the position of Cell
Leader R-21 and make him whole.
Of course, the foregoing is without
prejudice to the Company's right to
take appropriate
action if the
grievant fails to perform the job
satisfactorily.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

AUGUST 28, 1997

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
Between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case# 13 300 0039093

UNITED FEDERATION OF TEACHERS,

-andLUTHERAN MEDICAL CENTER,
-X

In
(hereinafter

accordance
the

with

"Agreement"

the
or

Collective
the

"CBA")

Bargaining
between

Agreement
the

above-

referenced Union and Employer, the Undersigned was designated

as the

Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute relating to the Union's claim
that

clinical

nurse

specialists and pediatric nurse

practitioners

should be included in the bargaining unit.
The Union poses the issue and requested remedy as follows:
Issue
Did

Lutheran

Medical

Center

(hereinafter

"Employer"

or

'Lutheran") violate Articles 1 to 10, 13 to 16, and 18 to 20 of the

CBA when it refused to include in the bargaining unit the job titles
clinical nurse specialists (hereinafter "CNSs") and pediatrician nurse
practitioners (hereinafter

"PNPs")?1

Remedy
A

finding

that Articles

1 through

10, 13 through

16 and

Articles 18 through 20 have been violated, and further, the issuance
of a directive ordering inclusion in the bargaining unit of Registered
Nurses (hereinafter "RNs") hired to work as CNSs and PNPs.
The

Employer

poses

the

issue

and

requested

remedy

as

follows:

Is the Employer in violation of the CBA by its refusal to
include

in

the

bargaining

unit

defined

by

the

CBA

the

following

classifications of employees, CNSs and PNPs?2
Remedy
A finding that the grievance is untimely and not arbitrable,
or

not

arbitrable

jurisdiction

of

the

because

the

National

issue
Labor

is

within

Relations

the

Board.

exclusive
But

if

arbitrable, deny the grievance on the merits.

1 The Union, in its brief, alleges that the issue before the arbitrator in this matter is whether "the titles of CNSs and Nurse
Practitioner (hereinafter "NPs") are included within the bargaining unit." For purposes of this Decision and based on the
record, PNP's and NP's are treated as synonymous.
2 The Employer alleges in its brief that "ultimately, the issue before the Arbitrator is not one of recognition or coverage, but
rather whether the work of CNSs and PNPs changed in or about 1990, so as to infringe upon the work of covered
Employees." I conclude that this argument relates to the issue of "timeliness."

Hearings
Hearings

were

held

at

the

offices

of

the

American

Arbitration Association on December 8, 1993; February 1, February 2,
November 22, 1994; January 24, October 10, December 4, 1995; and June
20, 1996.

At all times representatives of the parties appeared and

were afforded
examine

full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to

and cross-examine witnesses.

Lutheran

was

represented

Joseph F. Seminara, Esq. and Carl A. Schwarz, Jr., Esq.
represented
waived.

by Mr.

Lawrence

D'Addona.

by

The Union was

The Arbitrator's

Oath

was

All witnesses were sworn; a stenographic record was taken.

The parties filed post-hearing briefs dated January

15, 1997.

The

Employer filed a reply post-hearing brief on or about March 4, 1997.
The Union did not file a reply post-hearing Brief.

Due to the length

and substance of the record, the parties waived the time limits under
the rules of the American Arbitration Association for rendition of the
Award and Opinion.
Background
Bargaining History
In 1979 the United Federation of Teachers (hereinafter "UFT"
or

"Union") became the sole bargaining

nurses

employed

by

Lutheran

by

agent

defeating

for the

New

York

Association in an NLRB directed certification election.

professional
State

Nurses

The first CBA

the UFT and Lutheran executed was effective from 1980-1983.

The next

CBA was effective from 1983-1986.
CBA was negotiated.

Between 1986 and 1988, yet another

In 1988, a new CBA became effective until 1990.

For the period 1990-1992, the parties executed another CBA.

Finally,

in 1992, both Lutheran and the Union entered into the current contract
which governs this dispute.
During these years

and these six distinguishable contract

negotiations, three other new job classifications were added to the
bargaining

unit

classifications
therapists,

by

means

include

of

mental

and assistant

nurse

collective

health

bargaining.

clinicians,

epidemiologists.

These

alcoholism

nurse

It is undisputed

that at no time were the classifications PNPs or CNSs part of that
addition.
The Grievance Procedure
The record indicates that on September 24, 1992, the Union
wrote a letter to Ms. Sally Eaton, Vice President of Nursing
of

Lutheran

discussing

Medical

Center,

requesting

the referenced grievance

a

conference

(Step 2 request).

In

this letter, the Union alleged that Lutheran Medical Center
had hired Registered Nurses

(RNs) to work as Clinical Nurse

Specialists (CNSs) and Nurse Practitioners (NPs) - excluding
these job titles from the bargaining unit.

The Union also

accused the Employer of violating Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19 & 20 of the CBA.

On November 18, 1992 the Union wrote to Mr. Miles Kucker,
the Vice President of Human Resources of Lutheran Medical
Center,

again

requesting

a

conference

to

discuss

the

referenced grievance (Step 3 request).
On

January

29,

1993

the

Employer

responded,

explicitly

On March 5, 1993 the Union demanded arbitration.

The Demand

denying the Union's grievance.

stated that the dispute concerned the "Employer's hiring of
RNs

to

work

as

CNSs

and

NPs

(The NP

is

the

successor

classification to the PNP title) performing bargaining unit
work,

yet

excluded

them

from

the

bargaining

violation of Articles 1-10, 13-16 and 18-20."

unit,

in

The remedy

sought by the Demand is "a finding that Articles 1-10, 13-16
and

18-20 have

been violated and,

further,

a directive

ordering included in the bargaining unit, those Registered
Nurses hired to work as Clinical Nurse Specialists and Nurse
Practitioners performing bargaining unit work."
Pertinent Contract Provisions
ARTICLE 1
SCOPE OF AGREEMENT

Covered Employees.
unit:

This agreement covers employees in the following

INCLUDED:
All full-time, regular part-time and regularly
scheduled per diem registered professional nurses employed
by the Employer at its Hospital and Family Health Care
facilities located in Brooklyn, New York, including Staff

Nurses, Discharge Planning Nurses, Public Health Nurses,
Family Practice Nurses, Instructors
(Nurse Clinicians),
Utilization Review Nurses, Nurse Anesthetists, Mental Health
Clinicians.
Alcoholism Nurse Therapists, Assistant Nurse
Epidemiologists.
Assistant Nursing Care Coordinators, and
Head Nurses as set forth in the letter to the Union on that
Matter.
EXCLUDED:
Vice
President-Nursing
Services,
Assistant
Director
of Nursing,
Directors
of
Nursing,
Staffing
Coordinators, Director of Nursing Education, Utilization
Review Coordinator, Discharge Planning Coordinators, Nursing
Care Coordinators and all other employees, office clerical
employees, guards and supervisors as defined in the Act.
Employees in the unit (including nurses working pursuant to
a Registered Nurse Permit) are hereafter referred to as
"Registered Nurses."
Recognition. Employer recognizes the Union as the exclusive
collective bargaining representative of every Registered
Nurse covered by this agreement.
ARTICLE 19 -- GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
1. Grievances.
Except as otherwise provided in this
agreement, every grievance the Union (and the Registered
Nurses it represents) may have arising from application
or interpretation of this agreement or otherwise will be
adjusted as stated below.3
A grievance which affects a
substantial number or class of Registered Nurses, or on
behalf
of
the
Union,
in
which
the
Employer's
representative in Step One lacks authority to settle may
initially be presented at Step Two by the Union's
representative, provided that such grievance must be
filed within the time period set forth in Step One of the
grievance procedure as set forth herein.

A Registered Nurse who feels himself/herself aggrieved by a direction to perform a certain task shall not refuse to perform
the task but shall perform the same and then submit his/her protest as a grievance, provided that a Registered Nurse shall not
be required to perform a task which would present an immediate danger to the health or safety of the Registered Nurses.
3

6

2. Informal Discussions.
A Registered Nurse who has a
grievance
will present the claim promptly
to the
Registered Nurse's supervisor.
The Registered Nurse and
the supervisor will discuss and attempt to resolve this
complaint.
3. Procedure and Time Limits; Step One.
If the grievance
is not adjusted by informal discussion as provided for in
paragraph 2, the Union may serve a written notice of
grievance
on the applicable
clinical Director,
or
designees, within ten (10) days after occurrence of the
facts on which the grievance is based. If no such notice
is served in the time specified, the grievance will be
barred.
Within ten (10) working days thereafter, or
within five (5) days following any conference between the
local
representative
and the
Clinical
Director
or
designees, the answer of the Clinical Director shall be
given to the local representative.
4. Procedure and Time Limits: Step Two:
If the grievance
on the Hospital's Vice President
for Nursing,
or
designees, within ten (10) working days after the answer
at Step One.
If no such notice is served in the time
specified, the compliant will be barred. Within ten (10)
working
days
thereafter, or within five
(5) days
following any conference between the general or local
representative and the Vice President for Nursing or
designee, the answer of the Vice President for Nursing
shall be given in writing to the general or local
representative.
5. Procedure and Time Limits: Step Three. If the grievance
is not adjusted in Step Two, the Union may, within five
(5) working days after the answer in Step Two, appeal the
grievance to Step Three by written notice served on the
vice-president for Human Resources, or designees.
If no
such notice is served within the time specified, the
complaint will be barred.
Within five (5) working days
thereafter, the answer of the Hospital shall be given in
writing to the Union.

6. Procedure and Time Limits; Step Four. If the grievance
is
not
adjusted
in Step
Three
and
involves
the
application or interpretation of this Agreement, such
grievance may be submitted to arbitration by the Union in
accordance with this Section. The Employer and the Union
will select the arbitrator, by mutual agreement, from
lists submitted to them by the American Arbitration
Association, under the Voluntary Labor Arbitration rules.
The arbitrator's decision will be final and binding on
the parties.
If the grievance is not submitted to
arbitration under this paragraph within fifteen (15) days
after the Employer's answer in Step Three, it will be
barred. The fees and expenses of any arbitration will be
shared equally by the parties. The arbitration shall be
handled in accordance with the then-existing rules of the
American Arbitration Association.
7. Arbitrator's Power;
Limitation.
not have any power to add to
otherwise amend this agreement.

The arbitrator shall
or subtract from or

8. Time Limits and Miscellaneous.
All time limits herein
specified shall be deemed to be exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays.
The time limits specified in this
Section shall be deemed to be substantive provisions and
failure to comply with such time limits or any of them
shall be a complete bar to any action by reason of such
grievance. Failure on the part of the Employer to answer
a grievance at any step shall not be deemed acquiescence
thereto and the Union may proceed to the next step.
9. Attendance at Arbitration Hearing.
With appropriate
notice and where not inconsistent with effective and
efficient
operations,
the Hospital
will release a
Registered Nurse for attendance at an arbitration hearing
as a witness or participating grievant.

Contentions of the Union
CNSs and PNPs are Registered Nurses. Covered by the Agreement
The Union argues that CNSs and PNPs are RNs and therefore
automatically covered by the
Clause.

language

of

the

Recognition

More specifically, the Union contends that the two

titles at issue are properly included in the bargaining unit
based upon the National Labor Relations Board
"NLRB")

certification

and

the

recognition

(hereinafter
clause

which

certifies the Union as representing all "Registered Nurses."
CNSs and PNPs perform the same duties as staff nurses
The Union asserts that CNSs and PNPs perform the same duties
as RNs.

Essentially these duties include patient care and

necessitate extensive patient interaction.

So, on the basis

of job duties, alone, the CNSs and PNPs must be included in
the bargaining unit.
CNSs and PNPs are not Supervisors
The

Union

rejects

the

notion

that

CNSs

and

PNPs

are

"supervisors" as defined by the National Labor Relations Act
(hereinafter NLRA) or by case law.

The Union argues that

CNSs and PNPs include professional nurses who function as
such, notwithstanding their Employer designated titles.
The

Union

exercise

contends
"managerial

that

the

judgment"

titles
as

in

question

supervisors

do

not

within

the

health

care

industry.

Rather,

the

exercise judgment as professional
care as distinguished

Service.
Health

a supervisor;

Inc. 384 F.2d 143, 145
Care

Center.

113

they

judgment within the

To support this contention

the Union relies on the following:
defines

argues,

nurses vis-a-vis patient

from exercising

traditional supervisory context.

NLRA which

Union

Section 2(11) of the
NLRB

v.

Security

Guard

(1967); NLRB v. Hillview

LRRM

2336

(1983) ;

Mt .

Airy

Psychiatric Center, 253 NLRB 139 (1981) ; Waverly-Cedar Falls
Health

Care

Center.

Presbyterian

Medical

Inc.

983

Center,

F.2d

218

626

NLRB

Mary's Hospital Inc., 220 NLRB 496

(CAS)

1266

(1991);

(1975);

St.

(1975); Newton-Wellesly

Hospital. 219 NLRB 699 (1975); Trustees of Nobel Hospital,
218 NLRB 11015 441

(1975); Wing Memorial Hospital Assoc.,

217 NLRB 1015 (1975); Passavant Health Center, 284 NLRB No.
62, 125 LRRM 1274

(1987); NLRB v. Brown and Share Mfg. Co..

1169 F.2d 331 (CA 1 1948) .-Beverly Manor Convalescent Centers
v. Steelworkers. 264 NLRB 128.
decision

in

Res-Care,

The Union also relies on the

Inc. , 261

NLRB

22

to

support

the

contention that nurses are not supervisors when exercising
discretion in the best interest of the patient as opposed to
the

employer's

professional

best

interest.

registered

nurses

10

The

Union

(both

contends

CNSs

and

that
PNPs)

traditionally assign work and direct personnel in the health
care setting, whether it be a hospital or a home health care
setting.
also

These professional nurses, according to the Union,

coordinate

patient care,

engage

in hands-on patient

care, instruct their colleagues and act as resource persons
for their colleagues for the improvement of patient care.
(Arbitrator's emphasis)
Additionally, the Union argues that to whatever degree the
two titles exercise "independent judgment"

in the area of

patient care, they nonetheless do not exercise the type of
judgment set forth in Section 2(11) of the NLRA.

Namely,

they lack the authority to recommend that bargaining
employees

be

disciplined,

hired,

transferred,

unit

suspended

or

otherwise

laid off or recalled, promoted

or

otherwise

rewarded or to adjust grievances or represent the Employer
within

the

grievance

process.

Other

areas

of

the

two

titles' authority, the Union argues, relate to routine and
clerical type matters.

In short, the Union contends that

PNPs and CNSs do not exercise any meaningful authority in
areas which do not touch upon or otherwise relate to patient
care .

11

CNSs do not meet any of

the Secondary

Indicia

and that this

Absence Weighs in favor of a Finding of Non-Supervisory Status
The Union points out that the CNS's job description does not
list any activity which per

se constitute the indicia of

supervisory status.
The Union contends that "various secondary indicia regarding
supervisory

status" of CNSs under

the NLRA

cited by the

Employer has not been substantiated by the evidence.
It dismisses the emphasis the Employer has placed on the
fact that the CNSs attend management meetings.
argues

that the main purpose

of

the

CNSs'

The Union

attendance at

these meetings is to deal with issues of clinical patient
care where only professional nursing judgments are utilized.
To support
Memorial

this contention the Union relies on Brookhaven

Hospital,

29

RC

6854,

issued

by

the

Regional

Director Blyer on June 29, 1988.
Contentions of the Employer
The Union has the Burden of Proof
The

Employer

asserts

that

the

Union

has

the

burden

of

proving that the Agreement should be interpreted to include
the classifications of CNSs and PNPs.

The Employer argues

that the Union has failed to satisfy this burden.
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CNSs and PNPs Perform Functions which are Significantly Different
From those Performed by Employees in the Bargaining Unit
It

is

the

Employer's

position

consistently performed work

that

CNSs

and

PNPs

have

that is not the same as work

performed by employees in the bargaining unit.

The Employer

also contends that the Union has failed to show that the
work

performed

by

bargaining unit
explains

that

the

work

CNSs

covered

and
by

the

PNPs

is

exclusively

CBA.

The

in the health care setting, all

health care providers

often perform

Employer
levels of

the same tasks

while

performing their specific separate functions.
PNPs do not have a Community of Interest with RNs and should not
be Included in the Bargaining Unit
The Employer

asserts that PNPs do not

have

a sufficient

community of interest with RNs covered by the Agreement to
be

properly

specifically,

included
the

in

the

Employer

bargaining

contends

unit.

that

there

More
is

no

interchange between PNPs and bargaining unit RNs, and that
there

are

important

differences

between

the

skills

and

functions of the PNPs and bargaining unit RNs.
In addition to being responsible

for providing primary care

to

responsible

patients,

PNPs

are

also

for

insuring

compliance with hospital protocols and for authorizing RNs
13

to

dispense

controlled

substances.

submits that in carrying

The

Employer

also

out their responsibilities, PNPs

work under the supervision of the Director of Pediatrics and
not the Department of Nursing.
bargaining

unit

RNs

do

qualifications as PNPs.
the

Employer

employment

not

The Employer
have

similar

asserts that
professional

In addition, the RNs and the PNPs,

contends,

have

as PNPs typically:

disparate
(1) work

conditions

independently

of
only

seeing patients by appointments as a physician would; and
(2) direct RNs much in the same way as do physicians.

To

support this contention the Employer relies on the following
cases:

Safeway Stores. 250 NLRB 918 (1981); Compact Video

Services, 284 NLRB 117 (1987); Gitano Distribution Center,
308 NLRB 1172.
The Plain Language of the CBA's Recognition Clause should Govern
this Dispute
The

Employer

Agreement
submits
Agreement

contends

should
that

that

govern.

the

the

plain

meaning

bargaining

unit,

as

defined

(in the coverage and recognition

Employer

argues,

recognition

covered by the Agreement.
14

the

More specifically, the Employer

is

in

the

sections) does

not include the CNS or the PNP classifications.
the

of

limited only

Instead,
to RNs

To support this contention the employer relies on the fact
that 1) explicitly excluded from Article 1 of the Agreement
is "all other employees not expressly included";

(Emphasis

added)

is

2)

expressly

included

by

Article

1

only

"Registered Nurses covered by this Agreement"; and 3) the
Arbitrator, pursuant to Article 19, does not have the power
to

"add

to

Agreement."

or

subtract

Accordingly,

from

or

otherwise

the Employer

argues,

amend

the

the plain

meaning of the Agreement should govern - PNPs and CNSs are
not

and have not been RNs

covered

by

the Agreement

and

therefore should not be deemed bargaining unit nurses.

To

support this argument the Employer relies on the following
case law:

Armstrong Rubber Co. . 87 LA 146

(Bankson, 1986) ;

General Tel. Co. 86 LA 293 (Ipavac 1985) and Hamady Brothers
Food Mkt. 82 LA 81 (Silver 1983) .
CNSs and PNPs have Historically not been part of the Bargaining
Unit
The Employer submits that by a long-established practice the
parties
unit.

have

excluded

CNSs

and

PNPs

from

the

bargaining

At no time in the history of Union representation of

RNs at Lutheran were CNSs and PNPs represented by the Union
though these classifications have existed for many years.
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CNSs historically have not been included in the Bargaining Unit
The

Employer

functions

argues

that

the

that the
Union

bargaining

unit

collective

bargaining

Employer

also

existed

CNS

hopes
in

that

now

1978

agreement

contends

job

was

the

classification and
to

-

include

before
entered

exclusion

in

the

the

first

into.

The

of

these job

classifications and functions has been continuous and open
to the Union.

In fact, in the past, the Employer posted job

openings for CNSs as a non-Union position.

At least three

employees, previously members of the Union, resigned their
Union membership to take the CNSs position.
The exclusion continued from the first collective bargaining
agreement through succeeding negotiations and contracts for
about

15 years.

The Employer points out that at none of

these successive contract negotiations did the Union claim
bargaining unit coverage.

For that reason alone, argues the

Employer, the Union is now estopped from asserting a claim
that it failed to make for a decade and one-half.
PNPs historically have not been included in the bargaining Unit
The

PNPs

forward,

title first appeared

in 1990.

From that date

the

the

"practice"

Employer

makes

16

same

and

"bargaining

history"

argument

that

it makes regarding

the

CNSs - namely their open and continuous "exclusion from the
bargaining unit."
Also,

in support

submits

that

of the

PNPs

exclusion

must

meet

argument

requirements

the

Employer

of

the

new

Department of Education regulations promulgated pursuant to
the amended Nurse Practice Act.
the

PNPs

were

hired

to

Physician's Assistants.

According to the Employer,

perform

the

function

of

This work has never, according to

the Employer, been performed by RNs
they are not

job

trained to handle

in the bargaining as

it and could not

legally

perform it.
CNSs are Supervisors
The

Employer

contends

that

CNSs

are

"supervisors"

"managerial employees" as defined by the NLRA.
it argues, CNSs must be excluded
Agreement.
authority
asserts

and

Accordingly,

from coverage

under the

The testimony of the CNSs shows they have the
to exercise

that

power.

The

the functions of a "supervisor"

performed by the CNSs
participating

"supervisory"

including,

but

not

in the hiring/firing process;

Employer

clearly are

limited to, 1)
2) evaluating

employees job performance; 3) interviewing prospective job
candidates; 4) scheduling
17

of employees'

vacation, holiday

and personal time; 5) creating protocols and procedures for
the

Employer;

installation

6)
of

directing
new

the

equipment;

selection,
7)

selection of budgeting procedures;

purchase,

participating

in

and
the

8) attending management

meetings exclusive to management and supervisory employees;
and 9) overseeing general policies of the hospital including
personnel policies, bargaining tactics and strike plans.
support

this

contention,

the

Employer

relies

on

To

Section

2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 USCA 141 et .
Seq. ("the Act"), which defines supervisors; Ohio Power Co.
v. NLRB, 176 F. 2d 385, 387

(6th Cir. 1949), cert, denied

338 U.S. 899 (1949); NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp.,
128 L. Ed. 2d 586 (1994); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.. 416 US
264, 85 LRRM 2945

(1974); General Dynamics Corp., Convair

Aerospace Division. 213 NLRB 851, 857, 87 LRRM 1705 (1974);
NLRB

v.

Yeshiva

University,

444

US

672,

103

LRRM 2526

(1980) .
In short, the Employer submits, based on the entire record,
and

especially

subpoenaed

the

testimony

of

the

nine

CNSs

who were

by the Union as witnesses, that CNSs have the

authority, using

independent

judgment, to exercise one or

more of the twelve activities of a "supervisor" in a non-
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routine

manner,

and

additionally

demonstrate

elements of

both clinical and administrative supervision.
The Union's grievance is untimely
The Employer argues in its brief that the Arbitrator should
dismiss

the

"unreasonable
failure

Union's
delay"

grievance

on

pursuing

the

in

the

grounds

grievance

and

of
its

to comply with the time limits of the grievance

procedure.
The Employer deems this case to be an attempt by the Union
to

"change"

"accrete"

to

the
it

structure
the

of

the

bargaining

classifications

"clarify" the scope of the unit.

CNS,

unit;

PNP;

or

to
to

It submits that Congress

gave the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction over such petitions,
and

such

matters

are

beyond

the

arbitrators

limited

authority to "interpret" the Agreement.
The Employer relies on the following cases:

Magnesium

Casting Co. v. NLRB. 401 U.S.137 (1971); United Glass
Workers v. NLRB. 463 F. 2d 31 (3 Cir. 1972); American
Broadcasting Co., 112 NLRB 605, 36 LRRM 1063 (1955);
American Hosp. Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606 (1991); Leedom v.
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Laramee v. French & Bean Co., 830
F. Supp. 803 (1993); Couchigian v. Rick. 489 F. Supp. 54
(D.C.

Minn 1980); General Warehouseman and Helpers Local
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767 v. Standard Brands. Inc.. 560 F. d 700 (5th Cir. 1977);
Local Union 204, Electrical Workers v. Iowa Electrical
Workers v. Iowa Electric Light and Power Co., 668 F. 2d 413
(8th Cir. 1982); and McDonnell Co., 173 NLRB 225, 69 LRRM
1283 (1968) . Massachusetts Electric Co., 248 NLRB 155, 103
LRRM 1404 (1980); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 80 S. Ct 1358, 46 LRRM 2423 (1960); Barrantine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.. 101 S. Ct. 1437 (1981);
Seafarers v. National Marine Servs., 639 F. Supp.1283, 1290
(E.D. La. 1986) .
The Relief Requested by the Union should be sought through
Collective Bargaining
According to the Employer, the Union has added three other
new job classifications to the bargaining unit through the
collective bargaining process.

The Employer believes that

the CNS and PNP classifications, if they are to be added to
the Agreement, must be accomplished through collective
bargaining, not by arbitration.
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OPINION

Issue
The parties were unable to agree upon a precisely worded
issue.

Based on the entire record before me, including the

voluminous documentary evidence introduced in the course of
the hearings, and the extensive testimony consisting of over
824 transcript pages and 47 exhibits, two post-hearing
briefs, and one reply brief, I deem the issue in this case
to be :
Is the Employer in violation of any of the provisions
in the collective bargaining agreement by not including
in the bargaining unit the employees classified as PNPs
and CNSs?4

If so, what shall be the remedy?

Timeliness and NLRB Jurisdiction
At the outset, let me address two matters - the Employer's
claim that the Union's grievance(s) is not contractually
arbitrable and the Employer's assertion that the issues in
this case fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
NLRB.

The facts indicate that the PNP title has now been survived by the NP title. As stated earlier for the purposes of this
Decision and Award, both titles are being dealt with synonymously.

4
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I dismiss the Employer's contention that because of the
Union's failure to comply with the contractual time limits of the
grievance procedures of the contract and because of the general
contractual law of laches, the Union's case is not justiceable on the
merits.

I dismiss those contentions, not on contractual grounds, but

on well-settled principles of arbitral law.

It is true that a defense

of non-arbitrability may be raised for the first time when
procedurally

applicable - at the time of the arbitration hearing even

if not asserted during the grievance procedure.

But that is not the

situation here.
Here the Employer did not definitively raise that defense
(i.e. the application of the time limits and the principle of laches)
until after the hearings but for the first time in its brief.

To be

effectively considered by the arbitrator, a defense of nonarbitrability and/or laches must be pleaded, at the latest, during the
adversarial aspects of the case, namely during the hearing.

Only that

way can the responding party deal with it on an evidentiary basis and
be given the opportunity to rebut or explain any delays in processing
the grievance.

In short, non-arbitrability like any defense on the

merits, is an issue subject to the evidentiary, adversarial and due
process phase of the dispute, namely the hearing.
Only impliedly at best, but obviously inconclusively, did
the Employer possibly touch on non-arbitrability at the hearing.
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It

asked the witnesses occupying the disputed titles when they began
performing duties which the Union alleged fell within the bargaining
unit tasks of RNs.

From this it may have planned to point out later,

as it did in its brief, that the merits of the Union's assertions
notwithstanding, the employees involved and the Union knew or should
have known the alleged facts of this case long before the grievances
were filed, but failed to file within the prescribed time limits.
However, non-arbitrability must be pleaded affirmatively and
particularly.

It cannot be left to implication or later argument on

facts left undeveloped and unconnected to contractual time limits or
the principle of laches.

Like the statute of limitations, the issue

must be joined and perfected clearly and unequivocally where it can be
dealt with in the proper evidentiary manner - at the hearing.
The Employer's questions of the witnesses could be
interpreted as intended to raise the issue of timeliness, but they are
just as susceptible to other intentions, like simply a testing of the
witnesses testimony on whether those duties were in fact performed.

I

assume that is why the Employer, in its brief, asks the Arbitrator to
determine if and when the job duties of CNSs and PNPs "changed" to
include bargaining unit work.
But that is not enough to put the non-arbitrability or
laches defense to the due process test.
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Therefore, I reject and

dismiss the Employer's threshold claim that the Union's case is not
arbitrable.
I also dismiss the Employer's procedural argument that I do
not have jurisdiction over the merits of this case because they belong
exclusively to the NLRB.

The Employer interprets this case as one in

which what the Union seeks, and the remedy the Union requests, are in
the nature of "unit determination," a change in, clarification of or
an "accretion" to the existing bargaining unit.

And that any such

petition(s) is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, and
therefore not within the arbitrator's jurisdiction or authority.
With that interpretation of the authority of the NLRB, I
agree.

But I do not see this case as one of "unit determination" or a

change in, clarification of or an "accretion" to the unit.

Rather, I

see this case, and my authority as the arbitrator, as strictly a
matter of contract interpretation and the application of relevant
labor law to that interpretation.

Put another way, I hold that it is

fully within my jurisdiction to interpret the contract, and more
specifically, the Recognition Clause thereof, to include or not
include the disputed classifications involved in this case.

And, as

"external law" was introduced into this case by both parties, to apply
relevant case law in making or supporting that interpretation.

As

such, I view this case, albeit lengthy, contentious, and closely
litigated, as a "garden variety" contract interpretation with proper
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and authoritative consideration of controlling law.

That is the role

and responsibility of the arbitrator, and as such it neither usurps,
nor encroaches on nor substitutes the arbitrator's judgment or power
for that of the NLRB.
In sum, the Employer's view of the arbitrator's role and the
possible effect of his decision are not this Arbitrator's view of what
is before him.
Accordingly, without prejudice to the rights of the parties
under the NLRA and/or before the NLRB, the Employer's contention that
this case belongs exclusively with the NLRB, is rejected.

This

arbitration decision should not be construed as ousting the NLRB from
jurisdiction.

Therefore, any NLRB jurisdiction over the subject

matter of this case is expressly reserved to the NLRB.
I make the same response to the Employer's alternative
argument that what the Union seeks is a change in the Recognition
Clause requiring bilateral bargaining.

Obviously, my authority in

this case to interpret the contract and particularly the Recognition
Clause as written, and/or to subject it to an interpretive analysis
based on applicable case law, does not mean that the arbitrator is
changing or in any way adding to the present inclusiveness of the
Recognition Clause.

Such an exercise of arbitral authority is within

the arbitrator's jurisdiction and is not a change in the collective
bargaining agreement requiring bilateral bargaining.
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Interpretation of the Recognition Clause
The Recognition Clause is ambiguous.

And the ambiguity is

not resolved favorably to the Union.

Under Recognition the

clause reads
"Employer recognizes the Union as the exclusive
collective bargaining representative of every
Registered Nurse covered by this Agreement."
This phrase is susceptible to two logical but opposing
interpretations.

It could mean that when negotiated (and

there is no evidence that the foregoing language has changed
since the first contract) it covered all employees who are
RNs whether or not they then had or subsequently were given
specialist titles, like CNS or PNP.

Or, with equal logic it

could mean that coverage extended only to RNs limited to the
RN title.
The words ". . .covered by this agreement" add to the
ambiguity.

RNs "covered by this agreement" could mean and

be limited to those set forth in the "INCLUDED" paragraph of
the Clause.
PNPs.

The titles "included" do not include CNSs or

So the general recognition language of RNs is

modified by the definition of those included, thereby
logically excluding CNSs and PNPs.

On the other hand, if

CNSs and PNPs (who are also RNs professionally) are to be
26

excluded because they are supervisory or managerial, why are
they not listed among the titles "EXCLUDED"?

Are they

excluded by the general exclusionary reference to
"supervisors defined in the Act"?

To ask those questions is

to answer them - the Recognition Clause is ambiguous.
Clarification of the Ambiguity
The traditional arbitral approach in resolving ambiguities,
is well settled.

The Arbitrator looks to the practice of the parties

under the ambiguous language and/or the negotiation history of that
language, and gains therefrom a clarification of what the parties
intended the Clause to mean and therefore what it means.
Here, there is both relevant past practice and negotiation
history.

Both are consistent and determinative.
In 1978 CNSs became employees.

There is no dispute that

they were not covered by the first collective bargaining agreement.
There is no dispute that any demand for their coverage was made by the
Union then or during the several contract negotiations that followed
over the years until the present either in negotiations, by grievance
or by petition to the NLRB.

There is no evidence that at some

significant point the work of the CNSs changed from what it was and
has been over the years.
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So, in short, the practice and the negotiation history show
that by the conduct of the parties, the title CNS was not included in
the unit and was not intended to be so included.
The same is true with regard to PNPs.

Since the

establishment of that title (s) in 1990 there have been two contract
negotiations.

During neither was the Recognition Clause amended to

include PNPs, nor was any demand made for their coverage.

The non-

union status of both PNPs and CNSs was "open and notorious."
However, three additions to the bargaining unit were
negotiated during the period of the six contract negotiations - mental
health clinician, alcoholism nurse therapists and assistant nurse
epidemiologists.
to do so.

So the parties knew how to add titles if they wished

That the two disputed titles remained non-Union and outside

the unit for the several years involved is persuasive evidence that
the parties jointly agreed or intended that they were not to be
included in the unit, with the attendant recognition that the work
they did was not unit work.
This has been especially true for the CNSs.

For example,

nurses, like Ms. Suzette Collins, prior to becoming CNSs, were
bargaining unit RNs represented by the UFT.
position at Lutheran in 1981.

She applied for a CNS

After she became a CNS at Lutheran and

since 1981, Union dues were no longer deducted from her pay check.
Other CNSs like Ms. Mary Ann Aquino, also followed suit.
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For example,

when Ms. Aquino became a CNS in 1987, she no longer remained in the
unit, as she immediately ceased paying Union dues.

The Union never

solicited Ms. Aquino to become a Union member once she became a CNS.
Yet another CNS, Doreen Fadel, also terminated her Union membership
when she became a CNS.

More specifically, before Ms. Fadel became a

CNS, she was a bargaining unit RN.

On or about 1988, Ms. Fadel

noticed a posting for a non-Union job as a CNS.
promoted to the new job.

She applied and was

With the new position, the Union never

questioned that Union dues were no longer deducted from her pay
checks.

Again, in 1992, Ms. Fadel applied for yet another CNS

position.

This position was also unequivocally considered non-Union

as Union dues were never taken from her salary.

Ms. Stals, another

nurse, applied for a CNS position which was posted as a non-Union job.
Once Ms. Stals accepted the CNS position, she discontinued paying
Union dues.

Since 1980, when Ms. Stals accepted the position as a

CNS, the Union never questioned her status as a non-Union employee.
The evidence relating to PNPs is certainly not contrary.
The Union called no PNP (or NP) to testify.
title is presently unfilled).

(It appears that the PNP

Hence, in evidentiary respects, the

Union's allegations regarding PNPs are unsupported by enough probative
evidence to meet the Union's burden of proof, both on the merits of
its case for and on the jurisdiction question of unit coverage of that
classification.
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Accordingly,

on the basis of clear past practice and

negotiation history, the Union has failed to show that the "ambiguous"
Recognition Clause" covers the disputed titles in this case.
The CNSs are Supervisors
The Law
On the law and on the merits, the facts show that the CNSs
meet at least the minimum standards of "supervisory
in the health care industry.
cited by the parties.

status"

I have read all the cases

All case citations notwithstanding,

National Labor Relations Board v. Health Care & Retirement
Corp., 146 LRRM 2321 (1994), is the current leading United
States Supreme Court Case that squarely governs this
dispute.

More specifically, it is this very case which is

fatal to the Union's theories.

The Union relies upon case

law where the test for determining "supervisory status" has
become inapplicable in light of the highest court of the
land's decision.
In National Labor Relations Board v. Health Care &
Retirement Corporation of America, 146 LRRM 2321 (1994) , the
United States Supreme Court determined that the National
Labor Relations Board's ("NLRB") interpretation of the third
prong of the three part test for determining a supervisor is
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invalid.

It is the NLRB's interpretation of this third

prong upon which the Union bases its case.
The first prong of the test specifies that an employee is a
supervisor, thus unable to be a bargaining unit member, if
the employee is able to engage in one of the following 12
activities enumerated by the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. 152(3):

"Any individual having authority, in the

interest of the employer, 1) to hire, 2) transfer, 3)
suspend, 4) lay off, 5) recall, 6) promote, 7) discharge, 8)
assign, 9) reward, or 10) discipline other employees, or 11)
responsibly to direct them, or to 12) adjust their
grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in
connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority
is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires
the use of independent judgment."
The NLRB's interpretation of the third prong of the
"supervisory test" the Supreme Court found invalid.

It is

this part of the test upon which the Union rests its case -namely whether or not the employee is acting in the
"interest of the employer."

Under the NLRB's definition of

"interest of the employer," a nurse would not be considered
a supervisor if the nurse was "supervising" in connection
with patient care.

However, the United States Supreme Court
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disagreed with the NLRB and held "Patient care is the
business of a nursing home [hospital], and it follows that
attending to the needs of the nursing home

[hospital]

patients, who are the employer's customers, is in the
interest of the employer. . .We thus see no basis for the
Board's blanket assertion that supervisory

authority

exercised in connection with patient care is somehow not in
the interest of the employer."

Id.

The cases on which the

Union relies in its brief including but not limited to NLRB
v. Hillview Health Care Ctr., 113 LRRM (BNA) 2336 (1983) and
Waverly-Cedar Falls Health Care Ctr., Inc., 933 F .2d 626
(8th Cir. 1991) turn on the NLRB's definition of "interest
of the Employer."

Accordingly, the rationale underlying the

Union's cases is now inapposite.
The Merits
Each of the nine CNSs below are supervisors, as defined by
the NLRA, as each has clearly testified to performing, with
the required "independent judgment" at least one of the
twelve requisite supervisory functions, enumerated, (supra)
and that these activities are in the "interest of the
Employer" as now defined.
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1. Gloria Gayle is a supervisor as she has the
authority, by way of recommendation, to hire,
discharge, promote, suspend, and discipline
employees
Ms. Gayle testified that she participates, by
way of recommendation, in the hiring, firing,
suspension, promotion, and discipline of
Lutheran's employees.

Ms. Gayle also attends

Nursing Practice Council meetings bargaining unit nurses are not invited to
attend these meetings.

The matters discussed

at these meetings include issues regarding
equipment and the implementation of new
policies.

With the burden of proof on the

Union to establish that Ms. Gayle is not a
supervisor, there is no

counter-veiling

persuasive evidence which would put her or
her duties within the bargaining unit
coverage.
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2. Lorraine Zawistowski is a supervisor as she has the
authority, by way of recommendation, to discipline,
discharge, and direct employees
Ms. Zawistowski testified that she observes
and evaluates new employees regarding their
clinical skills, administrative skills, their
ability to take reports, and communications
skills.

Ms. Zawistowski has evaluated

numerous employees including sitting down
with said employee at the end of shifts and
reviewing deficient performance areas.

She

has given written and verbal warnings to
employees and makes these evaluations on a
daily basis.

Ms. Zawistowski's

recommendations have played a significant
role in the firing and disciplining of
employees.

In addition, Ms. Zawistowski has

scheduled vacation time and holiday time for
Lutheran employees.

Accordingly, Ms.

Zawistowski has met the supervisory test.
3. Ms. Lisa Woody is a supervisor as she has the
authority to hire and direct employees
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Ms. Woody testified that she has the
authority to hire and supervises employees on
behalf of Lutheran.

Ms. Woody cites many

specific instances where she demonstrated
said authority.

Ms. Woody also schedules

vacation, holiday, and personal time for
workers.

In fact, some workers call her

personally if they are sick and cannot come
to work for the day.

Ms. Woody formulates

guidelines, creates job descriptions, attends
various management conferences where issues
related to the bargaining unit are discussed.
4. Maureen Liberth is a supervisor as she has the
authority to hire, discipline, discharge, and
promote employees
Ms. Liberth participates in the interview
process for RNs.

In addition she also is

involved in the disciplinary process,
including terminations and has given oral
written warnings.

Ms. Liberth is involved

with the promotion process, overseeing the
installation of new systems, and goal setting
for specific days. Ms. Liberth participates
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in various management committees, including
the Nursing Practice Council and the
Obstetrics Quality Improvement Committee.
Bargaining unit workers do not attend these
meetings as Lutheran policies and procedures
are discussed.

Ms. Liberth also attends

other meetings - the Perinatal Task Force,
the OB/GYN Leadership committee and ad hoc
committees.

Issues discussed at the

Leadership committee include issues such as
strike contingency plans and collective
bargaining proposals.
5. Suzette Collins is a supervisor as she has the
authority to discipline and direct employees
Ms. Collins is the Chairperson of the Skin
Care Sub-committee of the Clinical Council,
which includes representatives from
Lutheran's purchasing Department.

Through

the Committee she trials different products
and determines which products should be
purchased by Lutheran.

In at least one

instance, regarding the use and purchase of
special mattresses, her decision to purchase
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new equipment was based upon Lutheran's
desire to maximize patient care.

Ms. Collins

has the authority to discipline employees of
Lutheran.

Specifically, Ms. Collins' job

description allows her to write warning
notes.

In addition, Ms. Collins writes

procedures and protocols for Lutheran
employees to follow.
6. Elaine Meyerson is a supervisor as she has the
authority to direct and discipline employees
Ms. Meyerson writes the protocols and
procedures that are to be followed regarding
patients in her specialty and supervises the
bargaining unit nurses in the implementation
of those procedures.

Ms. Meyerson is a

member of many Lutheran management committees
including the Leadership Committee, the Task
Force on Education, and the Quality Assurance
Committee.

In addition, Ms. Meyerson

evaluates RNs regularly.

When she finds

deficiencies, she will counsel the involved
employees and if necessary initiate
disciplinary action.
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7.

Mary Ann Aquino is a supervisor as she has the
authority to direct and discipline employees
Ms. Aquino attends weekly management
meetings, one of which deals with the
creation of "clinical pathways" which are
crucial to Lutheran's implementation of cost
saving practices.

Ms. Aquino testified that

she formulates the care plan for orthopedic
patients and supervises other nurses in the
rendering of that care.

Specifically,

whether care has been given and the quality
of that care.

If her instructions are not

followed, she can instruct the Nursing Care
Coordinator to have the nurse in question
sent for further in-service training.

Ms.

Aquino has an office as she also functions in
an inter-departmental capacity.

For example

Ms. Aquino monitors resident physicians this responsibility is clearly not performed
by bargaining unit employees.
8. Doreen Fadel is a supervisor as she has the
authority to direct and discipline employees
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At the beginning of each day, Ms. Fadel
attends a meeting with the Surgical Residents
and the Director of Surgery where they
discuss the planning of care for the patients
for the day.

Subsequent to that meeting she

directs the x-ray department to perform
whatever x-rays are needed for the day, and
follows up to ensure that these tasks are
completed.

Ms. Fadel has the authority to

discipline and speak to the offending
employee.

If a persistent problem exists,

she requests the matter be investigated.

She

also reports patient care deficiencies to the
Chief of Surgery.
9. Catherine Stals is a supervisor as she has the
authority to layoff, adjust grievances and direct
employees
Ms. Stals is a member of the Special Care
Committee and conducts quality assurance
studies for continuous quality improvement of
the critical care rendered by Lutheran.
along with the directors of the various
departments, and the Vice President and
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She,

Assistant Vice President of Nursing Services,
is a member of the nursing Management
Committee.

At these committee meetings

management issues, such as layoffs, pending
strikes, collective bargaining

negotiation

matters, budgets, reorganization and
restructuring, the image of the hospital and
Lutheran's search for a new Chief Executive
Officer are among the agenda.

Unlike other

RNs, Ms. Stals has an office, writes orders
for patients, and creates her own daily
schedule.

In addition, Ms. Stals also

updates and maintains Protocols and
procedures and determines which bargaining
unit nurse should carry out those policies
and procedures.

Specifically, Ms. Stals

created the curriculum for the certification
training and administers a test at the end of
the training.
I find the foregoing testimony persuasive and legally
relevant.

In the absence of persuasive rebuttal evidence, and as

these were witnesses "called" by the Union, I must find their
testimony to be credible and conclusive.
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The PNPs have no Community of Interest with the RNs
The Union has presented no witnesses concerning the PNPs or
the duties they perform.

The only witnesses who testified in regard

to PNPs were Martha Maakestad and Patricia Ruiz.

These witnesses were

presented by the Employer.
Though the Employer has submitted that any ruling regarding
PNPs is beyond the arbitrator's authority and exclusively for the
NLRB,s

the Employer nonetheless has offered testimony and evidence

designed to show that there has never been a community of interest
between the PNPs and the RNs.

In fact, the Employer contends that

both groups possess significantly different skills and functions.
testimony is unrefuted by the Union and is highlighted in the chart
below:

5

supra.
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The

PNPs duties
Perform and direct
work as Pediatric
Residents and
Physicians
Assistants
Provide primary
care, perform
physicals, make
diagnosis, develop
treatment plans,
and independently
implement them.
PNPs develop their
own work schedule,
are not supervised
daily
Work with
physicians as
colleagues through
the use of formal
collaborative
agreements, as
required by New
York State (this
agreement governs
the terms and
conditions of
practice and is
incompatible with
the concept of a
collective
bargaining
agreement)
PNPs have not been
promoted from RN
classification

RNs duties

Record citation

Cannot legally
R at 703, 704, 767
perform work of
Pediatric Residents
and Physicians
Assistants
Bargaining unit
R at 766-767
nurses do not
perform these
functions

Are supervised on a R at 786
daily basis

RNs cannot perform
this work

R at 708, 709, 711713

RNs cannot be
R at 783
promoted to the PNP
classification
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PNPg duties

RNs duties

PNPs can prescribe
Pharmaceuticals and
must have advanced
training in an
accredited program
in pharmacology and
must be able to
write a
prescription
Must possess a
Masters degree or
pass a certified
test
Works independently
seeing patients by
appointments, may
conduct a physical
exam, interprets
test results, can
diagnose health
problems, and
maintains an
ongoing
relationship with
the patient
Compensation is
based on market
factors, training,
and education;
higher compensated
than RNs,- maintains
individual
liability insurance

This qualification
is not required

R at 763/764

This qualification
is not required

R at 763/764

Record citation

These duties cannot R at 766, 767, 769
be independently
performed

Compensation
R at 707, 783-85
determined by
collective
bargaining; covered
under general group
insurance policy

These factors point to the conclusion that PNPs and RNs do
not have the same community of interest.

Both groups possess

different training, compensation, duties, insurance, certifications,
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and responsibilities.

Accordingly, PNPs are not bargaining unit

employees within the meaning of the relevant law.
Finally, a relevant observation, albeit not technically a
matter of contract interpretation, but consistent with the legal
theory that employees should be free to exercise their rights to join
or refrain from joining a union.

I find no evidence in the record

which would indicate that the employees in the disputed titles who
testified wish to be included in the bargaining unit.
their testimony is otherwise.
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The thrust of

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Employer did not violate the collective bargaining
agreement by not including Clinical Nurse Specialists and
Pediatric Nurse Practitioners (a/k/a Nurse Practitioners) in
the bargaining unit.

Eric J. Schmertz, Arbitrator

DATED:

May 30, 1997

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
SS :

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION OF AMERICA -ANDNEW YORK BUS SERVICE
-X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION

OPINION AND AWARD

and
NEW YORK BUS SERVICE
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of SAM HARDY?
If not, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on September 9, 1997 at which time
Mr. Hardy, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives
of the above-named Union and Employer

appeared.

All

concerned

were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The grievant, a bus driver was discharged on July

1, 1997

following his involvement in a minor accident on June 26, 1997.

The

grievant's report of that accident in the Transportation Loss Incident
Report reads:
Both vehicles were stopped in traffic.
I reached down in my bag to get a tissue
and did not realize bus started rolling.

Tapped car in rear.
vehicle.

No damage to either

Driver of car said he heard

something pop in his neck.
arriv(ed) at 9:10.
car

and

driver

Supervisor

Knocked on door of

got

out

of

car

and

stretched and walked around like nothing
wrong.

Also

refus(ed) ambulance

when

police arrived.
At the time of the hearing, the driver of the car had made no
claim on nor commenced any action against the Employer or the grievant.
It is the Union's position that the grievant was disciplined
for this incident

and not for his overall driving or prior

accident

record; that the June 26th incident or accident was a "non-event" and too
insignificant to justify a discharge; that even if the grievant's prior
accident record is considered, that record should be discounted if not
expunged

because

discipline

or

several

accident

years

and

the

elapsed between

the

June

accident,

26th,

1997

grievant's

last

and that,

therefore, the latter does not qualify as a "trigger" for the extreme
penalty of dismissal.
The Employer asserts that the grievant was discharged for his
overall

accident

"triggering"

record,

and

that

the

June

26th

accident

was

the

incident following an extensive prior "chargeable" accident

record

and the imposition of "progressive discipline."

argues

that

the grievant's

full record

The Employer

falls within the rulings of

several of my prior decisions in cumulative accident cases, particularly
the

decisions

involving

Ronald

Stevenson and Clarence Hall.

Arnold,

Elizabeth

Gomez,

Clarence

The Union is wrong when it argues that this case is limited to
the June 26th accident.

The written report of the internal hearing of

July 1, 1997 states what that hearing
procedure) dealt with.
"We

(a formal step in the grievance

It reads, in pertinent part:

discussed

this

last

accident

of

6/26/97 and other numerous rear-end and
chargeable accidents..." (emphasis added)
Clearly, therefore, the grievant's entire accident record, not
just

the June

26th accident, was

the subject

of and basis

for the

discharge.
The grievant's prior accident record is extensive and either
undisputed or, at this point, unchallengeable.

He was suspended five

times for "chargeable" accidents -- a three-day suspension in September
1995; a two-day suspension in March 1987; a five-day suspension in March
1987; a two-day suspension in May 1987; and a one-week suspension in
January

1993.

challenged

None

of these suspensions

by the grievant or the Union.

were grieved

or otherwise

(One, in May 1987 was a

mandatory "statutory" penalty that was unappealable for an "unreported
moving violation."
undisputed.)

But it also included an "accident," which was and is

So, non-grieved, unchallenged or otherwise undisputed, the

"chargeable" accidents, for which
exclusively
arbitration.

or

in part

four of the five suspensions were

imposed, are no

longer

contestable

By count, and prior to his last suspension

in this

in January

1993, the grievant, hired in December 1984, was involved in five rearend accidents for which he was held chargeable; and other types of
accidents with his bus for which he was deemed responsible.

So, there is no question that the grievant was subjected to
discipline on a "progressive" basis, prior to the instant final penalty
of discharge.
Clearly,

the

June

26th

accident,

standing

serious enough to warrant the grievant's discharge.
stand alone.
accident

alone,

was

not

But it does not

It must be viewed against the back drop of his prior

record,

and considered

in accordance with my many

arbitral

rulings in cases involving cumulative accident records.
I am constrained to hold, as I have repeatedly held in prior
cases, that the severity of an accident that "triggers" a discharge is
immaterial if that accident is a continuation or further evidence of a
"propensity" for accidents or accident proneness.
Consistently I have held that:
"this Employer has a fiduciary
the

riding

public

it

duty to

transport s...and

may...take every reasonable step to insure
the

safety

of its buses

and the

safe

operation of those buses by its drivers.
Indeed

it has

a duty to do

so... .This

Employer may follow and take preventive
measures to insure not only the safety
of its equipment but safe driving by its
drivers.
would

Bluntly.

I require

I do not find nor

this Employer to wait

until there is a manor accident before

it takes steps to remove from its employ
a driver where record shows a propensity
for

accidents,

driving

violations

and

other infractions of operating rules and
procedures.

(emphasis added)

Was the June 26th accident a further example of the grievant's
"propensity

for

accidents"

conclude that it was.

or

"accident-proneness?"

Sadly,

I must

First, on June 26th, he committed two acts of

negligence. For whatever

reason,

he took his foot off the brake, or

lessened the pressure on the brake while stopped behind a car, on a road
that must have been on a decline.

In doing so, by his own admission, he

took his eyes off the road and off the car ahead to "reach down for a
tissue."

Second,

is an admission

arbitration hearing.

he made

in his

testimony

at the

He stated that he "stopped close" to the car ahead.

I must conclude, because a short roll of his bus made contact with the
car, that he had stopped too close to the car.
under

the

facts

insignificant

of

the

considering

event,
the

these

fact

Again, standing alone and

driving

errors

that his bus was

are

relatively

empty; that no

apparent injuries or material damage resulted.

But when viewed against

the

frame of the

grievant's

entire

record

and within the

Company's

"fiduciary" duty to insure safety, and unless mitigated or excused, they
are evidence of a continued propensity
incident of unsafe driving.

for accidents and as another

The

only

factor

of

possible

mitigation

and

possible

distinction from prior cases, is the Union's claim that about four years
elapsed

between

accident

the

grievant's

in 1993, and this

last

accident

"triggering"

or

discipline

accident in 1997.

for

an

Or that

because for four years, the grievant assertively drove accident free, he
should be deemed "rehabilitated" from that prior record and excused, if
not from all penalty, but from the extreme penalty of discharge.
I

need

not

consider

the

merits

argument because it is based on factual error.

or

the

equities

of

this

He was not accident-free

following the 1993 suspension.
A review of the grievant's employment record discloses that
the December 1992 accident (triggering his one-week suspension in January
1993)

was

not

his

last

accident,

either

"rear-end"

changeable, prior to the instant accident of June 26, 1997.

or

otherwise

His record,

which is undisputed and unchallenged in this proceeding shows that in May
1995 his "MIR struck the rear of a stopped auto," and that in November
1996

"while exiting a ramp,

(his bus) #1645, ran into the rear of a

stopped auto."
So, his

"propensity"

continued after the last suspension in

1993 by similar types of accidents in 1995 and 1996.

And

the 1996

accident was only eight months earlier than the final accident of June
26, 1997.
Considering

my consistent rulings

in prior cases, I cannot

credit the grievant with a factor of mitigation merely because the final
accident was minor.

Nor, because of his further "rear end" accidents in

1995 and 1996 can I consider any argument of "rehabilitation" subsequent
to his suspension in 1993 or the claim that his prior record is "stale."

In short, following a one-week suspension in January 1993, it
appears, undisputedly, that he was unable or unwilling to avoid "rearend" accidents.

His record remained unimproved and chronic.

As such it

represents a continuing risk of a further and more serious accident(s) if
he is retained in his job.

I regret this conclusion, considering the

grievant's almost thirteen years of service.

But if the Employer chooses

not to run the risk any further, the Arbitrator cannot require it to do
so.
The
bargaining

Undersigned,

Impartial

Chairman

under

the

collective

agreement between the above-named parties, and having duly

heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The discharge of SAM HARDY was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED:

September 25, 1997

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

SS :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION -and- WHITE PLAINS BUS
CO, INC.
X

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION

-andWHITE PLAINS BUS CO.,INC.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Is the grievance of Doreen Dunkley arbitrable?
If so, was her discharge for just cause?
A hearing was held at the offices of the Employer on April
14, 1997 at which time Ms. Dunkley appeared. Representatives of the
above-named Union and Employer also

appeared.

All

concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

I find the grievance non-arbitrable.
The Employer has a

contract with the County of Westchester

to provide school bus transportation.

Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Union
and

the

Employer,

specifically

Sections

15e

and

15h,

a

bus

driver/employee who has been decertified by the County is subject to
discharge by the Employer.
the County
discharge

to revoke
is

not

And if the Employer is unable to persuade

the decertification,

subject

to

arbitral

authority is limited to determining
decertified
Employer

and was

attempted

discharged
to

get

review.

whether

for that

the

the affected employee's

County

The

the employee

reason,
to

Arbitrator's
has been

and whether

revoke

or

the

lift

the

that Dunkley

was

decertification.
In the
decertified;

was

instant

case, it is undisputed

discharged

for

that

reason;

and

the

Employer

attempted but failed to persuade the County to reverse or revoke the
decertification.
The

Union

argues

that

the

contractual

proscription

on

arbitral review of the discharge relates only to an effort to get the
affected employee restored to the County work he or she performed
before

decertification.

But,

that

restoration

of

the

affected

employee to other work, and hence a review of the propriety of the
discharge

with

regard

to

assignment

of

work

not

under

contract with the County, is arbitrable.

And it is that review, with

a requested remedy that the grievant be restored to employment on work
other than under the Employer's

contract with the County, that the

Union seeks in this proceeding.
The Union's theory
unequivocal

and

is rejected.

unconditional.

It

First, the contract is

prohibits

employee's discharge for decertification.

arbitration

of

an

It does not provide, even

impliedly for an arbitral review of the propriety of the discharge for
other Employer

work.

Indeed, as there is no contractual right to

other work if an employee is decertified, there is no companion right
to challenge the discharge on the grounds that there may be other work
the employee

could perform.

To allow an arbitral

challenge to a

discharge for decertification, when the contract explicitly forecloses
such a challenge is to make the discharge "conditional" and related to
certain specific work
otherwise

(i.e. County work).

unconditional

contractual

Such a dilution of the

prohibition

on

review

of

a

discharge for decertification, cannot be sustained under the contract
language, under the finality status of any discharge, or logically.
Accordingly, the grievance

of Doreen Dunkley is dismissed

because it is not arbitrable.
The

Undersigned,

Impartial

Chairman

under

the

Collective

Bargaining Agreement between the above-named Union and Employer, and

having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The discharge of Doreen Dunkley is not arbitrable.

Eric J./Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

7

May 1, 1997

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss :

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION -and- WHITE PLAINS BUS
CO, INC.
-X

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
OF AMERICA
-and-

WHITE PLAINS BUS CO.,INC.

The stipulated issue is:
Was

there

just

cause

for

the

discharge

of

Benedetto?

If not, what shall be the remedy?

A

was

hearing

held

on

June

11,

1997

at

Frank

which

time

Mr.

Benedetto, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives
of

the

above-named Union

afforded full opportunity

and

Company

appeared.

All

concerned

were

to offer evidence and argument and to examine

and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The charge against the grievant, a school bus driver, is that
on April 30, 1997 he left a child on his van unattended.
The facts are essentially as follows:
While

transporting

children

home

from

school

the

grievant

overlooked a sleeping child; failed to drop that child off at the child's
stop; and after arriving at his own home with the van,1 left it and went

1

He had permission to take the van to his home at the end of his run.

into his house without checking it for any child asleep.

Within a few

minutes he went back out to the van "to close the windows and lock it"
and

then

discovered

that

the

child,

Christian

"Christian") had emerged from the bus on his own.

Hanley,

(hereinafter

Christian is 5 years

old.
On February 1, 1997, the Company promulgated and published a
memorandum dealing with this type of event.

The memorandum reads:

TO:

All Drivers & Monitors

FROM:

JMS

RE:

Leaving students on buses/van

DATE:

February 1, 1997

Over the past several years there have
been

a

school
students

number

of

bus/van
on

incidents
drivers

unattended

extended periods of time.
occurrences have been

in

which

have

left

vehicles

for

Many of these

reported

by the

newspapers and broadcast media.

In some

cases the drivers and monitors have been
charged

with

felony

including endangering
minor, etc.

criminal

acts

the welfare of a

The most important service we supply our
customers is the safe transportation of
their students/children.

In cases where

a

an

student

vehicle,

is

we

left

have

on

failed

protecting that student.

unattended

miserably

in

And we can be

charged with a criminal offense.
There have been numerous notices sent to
you

concerning

the

importance

of

checking your vehicle after each trip to
ensure

that

board.

We

there

is

no

have

also

one

left on

posted

notices

about this in the drivers' rooms.
Effective immediately, any driver and/or
monitor who is/are found to have left a
child on an unattended vehicle will be
taken

out

of

service immediately, and

subsequently,
their

if

fault,

it

have

is

proved

their

to

be

employment

terminated.
The Company asserts that the grievant's failure to check his
bus and to leave a 5 year old child undiscovered and unattended at the
end of his run is in direct violation of the foregoing instructions, and
for

the

reasons

set

grievant's discharge.

forth

in

the

memorandum, is

grounds

for

the

The grievant and the Union on his behalf do not dispute the
event.

The grievant explains that he did not see the child on the van;

relied on the children aboard to tell him of each of their presence so
that

he

could

make

the

appropriate

drop-offs;

that

he

by-passed

Christian's drop-off stop because he did not know nor was told by other
students that Christian was aboard; that upon arriving at his own home,
he

left

the

van

without checking

it

because

his

dog

was outside,

unleashed and possibly frightening to pedestrians on the sidewalk and
wanted to get the dog back inside; and that he left his van for only a
few minutes for that purpose before returning to it to find Christian
outside with a neighbor.

Thereafter, in response to a telephone call

from the Company's dispatcher asking about Christian (whose parents had
called the Company when he didn't arrive at home) the grievant drove
Christian home.
The Union argues that the period that Christian was unattended
was only a few minutes, not an

"extended period of time" within the

proscription of Paragraph 1 of the February 1, 1997 memorandum,- and that
because no damage or injury resulted, the penalty of discharge is too
severe, if not unjustified.
It is well-settled that an employer may promulgate work rules
that

are

relevant

to

the

job

involved,

and may

notice

and

impose

penalties for violations of those rules, provided the penalty "fits the
offense."
penalty

for

And if the requisite tests for a valid work rule and the
its violations

have

been

met, an arbitrator

should

not

substitute his judgment for that of the employer regarding the imposition
of the mandated discipline.

That applies here.

This Company's notice of February 1, 1997

was properly disseminated among the employees.

There is no evidence that

the Company has not applied it consistently and even-handedly to those,
if any, similarly situated.

Considering the nature of the Company's

Business

"fiduciary"

transport

and

especially

young

school

its

children

duty

safely,

the

and

responsibility

rule

is

to

reasonable,

appropriate and clearly relevant to the job and responsibilities of a
school bus driver.

Also, for the same reasons, it cannot be said that

the penalty of discharge for leaving a child unattended on a bus is
inappropriate or unreasonable.

It is a severe penalty, but relevant to

the offense,, consistent with the essential purpose of the rule, and
certainly not arbitrary.
In short, the Company has established a valid, bonafide reason
for the rule; has promulgated and noticed it properly,- and has mandated a
penalty, albeit a severe penalty, that•reasonably "fits the offense."
Accordingly, this Arbitrator finds no basis to invalidate the
rule or its mandated penalty.
Do
affirmative.

the

Both are upheld.

facts fit within the

rule?

My

answer

is

in the

First, I am not persuaded that the rule applies only in

cases where children are left unattended "for extended periods of time."
That phrase

is in the first Paragraph,

"incidents over the past several years."

and is only descriptive of

The rule, itself, however, is found in the final sentence:
Effective immediately, any driver and/or
monitor who is/are found to have left a
child on an unattended vehicle will be
taken out

of

subsequently,
their

service
if

fault,

terminated.

it

have

immediately, and
is

proved

their

to

be

employment

(emphasis added)

That sentence, enunciating the rule and the penalty applies to
when a child is left on an unattended vehicle.
unattendedness

to any period of time.

It does not limit the

So in this case, the few minutes

between when the driver left the bus to take his dog inside and his
return to the bus

"to lock up and close windows" was an "unattended"

period within the meaning of the rule.

Also, he did not state that his

return to the van was to check it for sleeping children.
he believed all the children had been dropped

off/

I conclude that

that the bus was

empty; and therefore probably would not have checked it for a sleeping
child or found Christian asleep had not Christian emerged from the bus
himself.

So, irrespective of the amount of time involved, the grievant

violated the rule and its critical purpose by not checking for sleeping
children when he arrived at the end of his run and by not stating that he
planned to do so after he secured his dog.
Moreover,
"unattended"

only

I
for

am
a

not

satisfied

few minutes.

that
I

find

Christian
that

was

Christian

left
was

"unattended,"

albeit

constructively,

from

boarding the bus - to the end of the run.

some

shortly

after

The grievant's negligence in

that regard is obvious from his own testimony.
aboard.

point

He had only 8 students

He did not square that number with the number of stops.

He

admits he made 7 stops to discharge the students, but knew or should have
known he had 8 students aboard.

Had he kept track of the stops, as I

believe he should have, he would have realized that he had missed one
stop

-- that one of the 8 children had not been dropped off.

serious,

I

think

is

that

instead

of

checking

who

was

More

aboard

and

rechecking each child passenger as he approached each regular stop (or
upon anticipating each next stop) he relied on the students themselves to
tell him who was still aboard.

He testified that he called out to the

students, asked who was still aboard and that two girls replied that they
were the only one's who remained.

So, instead of checking, himself, he

assumed that information was accurate, and did not even go to Christian's
stop.

Obviously, the two girls did not know Christian was still aboard

and misinformed the grievant.
responsibility

to them.

The grievant should not have abdicated his

As a result,

Christian

slept on,

and

grievant proceeded to the end of his run without checking further.
consider

this

not

only

negligent

inattention

but

the
I

"constructive"

unattendedness.
For the foregoing

reasons,

I find no basis to reverse the

Company's action on the grievant's discharge.
Accordingly,

the

Company

grievant and his discharge is upheld.

had

just

cause

to discharge

the

As the parties know, without prejudice to the validity and
continued enforceability of the Company's rule and without any precedent
for any future matters, it is for the Company to consider, in its sole
discretion,

whether, because of the grievant's good prior record, his

recognition of his mistake and his expressed remorse about it, he should
be re-employed without back pay on a "last chance basis," to available
work that does not include driving Christian.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above-named parties, makes
the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discharge
of Frank Benedetto.

Eric J/ Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED:

June 25, 1997

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION -and- WHITE PLAINS BUS
CO, INC.
-X

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
-and-

WHITE PLAINS BUS CO.,INC.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was

there

Hardy?

just

cause

for

the discharge

of James

If not, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held at the Employer's offices on April 14, 1997
at which time Mr. Hardy, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and
representatives

of the above-named Union

and Employer

appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was

waived.
The grievant was employed for about three and one-half years as
a van operator transporting handicapped passengers.
of

time

he

characterizes

was

involved

as

operating

responsible or at fault.

in

eleven

accidents

incidents
or

errors

During that period
which

the

for

which

Employer
he

was

Employer's Exhibit #1 lists them as follows,

inter alia:

10/11/94: Wheelchair customer fell out of wheelchair;
11/23/94: Turned onto a one way street going the wrong way
with passenger on board;

08/07/95: Customer wheelchair fell over while in transit
(allegedly faulty seat belt);
08/29/95: Damage to vehicle... (grievant) previous driver;
11/27/95: Lift hit the wheelchair, knocking customer over;
02/07/96: Hit overhang at Cabrini Nursing Home;
04/25/96: Backed van into another vehicle three times;
06/96:

Backed into car in parking space;

07/25/96: Made left turn-claims had green light.JBig
accident... (collided) with other motorist heading
North.

No injuries;

09/17/96: Backed into car...red paint from car on the van;
01/27/97: Damage to vehicle noticed:(grievant) prior driver.

Based on the foregoing record, the grievant was discharged on
January

28,

1997.

But,

following

intervention

by

the

Union,

discharge was reduced to a four-day suspension; the grievant

the

underwent

"re-training"; and returned to active duty on February 7, 1997.
Subsequently, following a hearing he was again discharged on
March 20, 1997.

That discharge is the subject of this arbitration.

The Employer asserts that despite the four-day suspension and
retraining, the grievant was seen by an Employer supervisor operating his
van on the Bronx River Parkway on February 27, 1997 at excessive speeds
and tailgating.
The

Employer

asserts

that

the grievant's

entire

record of

operating deficiencies, and especially his unsafe operation of the van
after

his

suspension

and

re-training,

amounts

to

an

inability

or

unwillingness

to drive safely

rules and training.

in accordance with prescribed operating

It is the view of the Employer that the grievant

"does not get it" when it comes to safety rules and procedures and that
it need not await a serious or fatal accident before removing him from
its employ.
The Union attacks the foregoing enumerated eleven incidents as
either not the grievant's fault or of insufficient seriousness to warrant
discharge.

The grievant and the Union on his behalf deny that he was

speeding or tailgating on February 27th.
The Union's attack on the validity of the eleven enumerated
incidents

leading

suspension)

is

to

his

misplaced.

first
In

discharge

(mitigated to

view

the

of

fact

that

a

four-day
by

Union

intervention, the discharge was reduced to a suspension, those incidents
are no longer challengeable.

The acceptance of a disciplinary penalty of

a four-day suspension is an acceptance by the grievant and the Union of
the bonafides of those charges and the appropriateness of a disciplinary
suspension

for them.

impeach those

In the instant case it is too late to try to

charges, or some of them.

As a matter of industrial

relations and arbitral law, they now stand unrefutable.
Therefore, the narrow question is whether, against the backdrop
of the four-day suspension and the re-training, the grievant committed
the subsequent operating offenses of speeding and tailgating, and if so,
whether

those

subsequent

offenses

should

trigger

the

penalty

of

discharge.
Assuming he was speeding and tailgating, it is manifest to me
that the penalty of discharge was proper.

As such it was a proper final

step application of progressive discipline, considering his prior record
and his recent accepted suspension

for that record.

Also, as I have

repeatedly held, an excessive number of accidents or operating incidents,
even if each is relatively
construed

by the Employer

propensity

minor, by a short-term employee, may be

as evidence of unsafe driving

to drive unsafely.

habits or a

And, as I have also frequently held,

because the Employer has a "fiduciary" duty of care to the riding public,
it may take preventative steps to remove from its employ drivers with
accumulating

unsafe

records,

without

awaiting

a

serious

or

fatal

accident.
So, the only remaining question is whether the grievant was
speeding and tailgating.

The Employer's evidence against the grievant

was presented by the testimony of the Employer's safety supervisor.
testified that he was in his car on the Bronx River Parkway

He

on the

morning of February 27; that the grievant, driving a van with a passenger
aboard was driving

faster than the 50 mph speed limit; that at some

point, the grievant got behind his (the Supervisor's) car and tailgated
him, closing to "a car length behind and gaining at about 50-55 mph, for
15-30 seconds."

At a point, thereafter, the grievant speedily passed him

and exited the parkway.
I
supervisor.

find

no

reason

in the

record

to disbelieve

the

safety

And, under the circumstances, I do not find it relevant to

inquire into why or how the supervisor was on the parkway at that time,
and thus able to observe the grievant.

There is no evidence it was

deliberate.

of a driver who has come off

But even if so, surveillance

suspension and has undergone re-training, is not improper.

I must conclude, therefore, that the grievant failed to heed
the

import

of

his

disciplinary

suspension

otherwise, to profit from the re-training.

and

failed,

willfully

or

Standing alone, speeding and

tailgating while on duty, with a passenger aboard is a serious offense.
For

it

to

happen

immediately

after

a

disciplinary

suspension

for

operating deficiencies and after re-training, is cause for discharge.
Especially so in the view of the Employer's special responsibility to run
a safe service with drivers who are safety minded.
The

Undersigned,

Bargaining Agreement

between

Impartial

Chairman

under

the

Collective

the above-named parties, and having

duly

heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The discharge of James Hardy was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

May 1, 1997

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION -and- WHITE PLAINS BUS
CO, INC.
x

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION

-andWHITE PLAINS BUS CO.,INC.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Are the grievances of Alicia Francia and Carmen
Mateus arbitrable?
If so, was there just cause for their discharges?
A hearing was held at the offices of the Employer on April
14,

1997

at

which

time

Ms.

Francia

and

Ms.

Mateus

appeared.

Representatives of the above-named Union and Employer also appeared.
All concerned were afforded

full opportunity to offer evidence and

argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
I find both grievances non-arbitrable.
The Employer has a contract with the County of Westchester
to provide school bus transportation.

Under the Collective Bargaining Agreement between the Union
and

the

Employer,

specifically

Sections

15e

and

15h,

a

bus

driver/employee who has been decertified by the County is subject to
discharge by the Employer.
the

County

to revoke

the decertification, the affected employee's

discharge

is

authority

is limited to determining whether the employee has been

decertified
Employer

not

And if the Employer is unable to persuade

and

subject

was

attempted

to

arbitral

discharged
to

get

for

the

review.

that

County

The

reason,
to

and

revoke

Arbitrator's

whether the
or

lift

the

decertification.
In the instant case, it is undisputed that both Francia and
Mateus were decertified; were discharged

for that reason; and the

Employer attempted but failed to persuade the County to reverse or
revoke the decertification.
The

Union

argues

that

the

contractual

proscription

on

arbitral review of the discharge relates only to an effort to get the
affected employee restored to the County work he or she performed
before

decertification.

But,

that

restoration

of

the affected

employee to other work, and hence a review of the propriety of the
discharge

with

regard

to

assignment

of

work

not

under

contract with the County, is arbitrable.

And it is that review, with

a requested remedy that the two grievants be restored to employment on
work other than under the Employer's contract with the County, that
the Union seeks in this proceeding.
The Union's theory is rejected.
unequivocal

and

unconditional.

It

First, the contract is

prohibits

employee's discharge for decertification.

arbitration

of

an

It does not provide, even

impliedly for an arbitral review of the propriety of the discharge for
other Employer work.

Indeed, as there is no contractual right to

other work if an employee is decertified, there is no companion right
to challenge the discharge on the grounds that there may be other work
the employee could perform.

To allow an arbitral challenge to a

discharge for decertification, when the contract explicitly forecloses
such a challenge, is to make a discharge "conditional" and related to
certain specific work
otherwise

(i.e. County work).

unconditional

contractual

Such a dilution of the

prohibition

on

review

of

a

discharge for decertification, cannot be sustained under the contract
language, under the finality status of any discharge, or logically.

Accordingly, the grievances

of Alicia Francia

and Carmen

Mateus are dismissed because they are not arbitrable.
However,

the

Impartial

Chairman

wishes

to

make

a

recommendation to the Employer, for the Employer to accept or reject
in its discretion.
Both grievants

are of relative lengthy service - Francia

since 1987 and Mateus since 1993.

Their employment records, except

for the incident which led to their decertification by the County,
have been in the Employer's words, "pretty unblemished."

They have

been "good employees."
Therefore, I recommend that the Employer give both grievants
another chance and reinstate them, without back pay, to available work
for which they are qualified, but, of course, not work under County
contracts or jurisdiction.

The terms, conditions and procedures for

any such reinstatement may be determined by the Employer alone.

The

Undersigned,

Impartial Chairman under

the Collective

Bargaining Agreement between the above-named Union and Employer, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The

discharges

of

Alicia

Francia

and

Carmen

Mateus, are not arbitrable.
Set

forth

in

the

Opinion

is

a

non-binding

recommendation of the Impartial Chairman.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

May 1, 1997

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN, LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION -and- WHITE PLAINS BUS
CO, INC.
-X

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
-and-

WHITE PLAINS BUS CO.,INC.
-X

The stipulated issue is:
Was

there

Carlton?

just

cause

for the

discharge

of

Renea

If not, what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on May 7, 1997 at which time Ms. Carlton,
hereinafter

referred

to as the

"grievant" and representatives

above-named Union and Company appeared.
opportunity

of the

All concerned were afforded full

to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-

examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The grievant had been employed for about two and one-half years
as a "monitor."

Her job was to ride on a Company van transporting young,

multi-handicapped children and to perform certain safety and monitoring
duties attendant to those children and their transport.

In the instant

case, the children were being driven to a special program at the St.
Agnes

School

under

Westchester County.

a transportation

contract between the Company and

Often a child is accompanied by a nurse's aide who

is employed by the child's parents and has special duties of care for the
particular child covered.

In this case, the involved nurse's aide was

caring for the child of a family named Rand.

During the trip, while on duty and while on the van, the
grievant and the nurse's aide engaged

in an angry, loud, profane and

highly charged argument.
The verbal confrontation between them was seen and overheard by
the children and the van driver.

Later, Mr. Rand, (the child's father)

called the Company, reported the argument and complained.
complaint

was

that the emotional

level

In essence his

of the argument,

the

obscene

language used and the bitterness of the confrontation was improper, was
upsetting

to

his

child

and

was

completely

inconsistent

with

the

grievant's duties and responsibilities as a monitor.
Based on

its investigation, the Company

confrontation was initiated by the grievant;

concluded that the

that irrespective

of the

reasons behind it, it was manifestly in conflict with her duties; and
because

it

was

in

front

of

the

children

and

disturbing

to

them,

discipline was justified.
And when, in the course of the subsequent grievance meetings
the

grievant

continued

her

invective

against

certain

management

employees, was unapologetic, showed no remorse and stated that if again
faced with a similar situation, would act the same way again, the Company
concluded that there were no mitigating circumstances which would allow
her to return to duty.

So, she was discharged.

The grievant and the Union on her behalf
argument, its intensity or its profane nature.
"provocation,"

a

set

of

circumstances

do not deny the

Rather, their defense is

which

explain

and

make

understandable the grievant's action and which, if properly considered,
constituted mitigating factors.

I accept as essentially accurate the grievant's version of what
led to the argument with the nurse's aide.

There is no testimony to

refute it. She testified that about a week before the incident she had a
miscarriage.

The record shows that some time earlier, she had had an

abortion.
The grievant asserts that the nurse's aide told the Rands (and
possibly others) about the miscarriage and stated to them something to
the effect that if the grievant "wanted a child, she shouldn't have had
an abortion."

This statement or something like it, the grievant viewed

as derogatory," none of the aide's or the Rand's business" and completely
unrelated to the job of either the grievant or the aide.
grievant

confronted

the

aide

about

that

or

those

On the van the

remarks,

and

the

argument and confrontation ensued.
The Union contends that the aide's revelation to the Rands was
so insensitive and such a breach of the grievant's privacy as to explain
the grievant's anger and impulse to confront her about it, even though
both were on duty in the van.

That the grievant may have lost her temper

and lost sight of where she was and particularly the presence of children
is understandable

and, considering the provocative nature of what the

aide

have

did,

should

been

viewed

by

the

Company

as

a

mitigating

circumstance, and should be so viewed by the Arbitrator.
There were also mitigating factors, asserts the Union when, on
the following Monday the grievant was discharged, following meetings with
management.

First it is claimed that when the grievant reported

at 7:30

she was told she was "out of service," and instructed to wait until Mr.
Turner could see her.

She waited until 9:00 or 9:30 for that meeting.

She testified that her baby at home was in the care of a sitter who had

to leave for school by 9:30.

So, when that time approached, fearful that

her child might be left alone, she became angry and agitated again, and
confronted management personnel belligerently, argumentatively and with
profanities.
At one point, she learned that the Company had sent the police
to her home, because the Company, I conclude honestly, believed that her
baby was

left alone.

But she interpreted that as an effort by the

Company to get her arrested for "neglect of a child." I am certain that
the Company acted in good faith and did not try to "entrap" her in any
criminal

offense,

but

I

conclude

she

made

that

erroneous

misinterpretation.
The delay in the meeting; the worry about coverage

for her

baby; and thereafter the thought that the Company had sent the police to
her home to entrap her, reignited and heightened her anger and loss of
control

and

explains

her

subsequent

intemperate

conduct,

claims the

Union. Again, the Union argues subsequent "mitigating" factors which the
Company should have recognized and which the Arbitrator should take into
consideration.
But no real

effort

is made to explain

away the grievant's

unchanged position that she would act similarly in the future if again
confronted with a similar

set of circumstances. She stated that "if

someone gets into her face, she'll get into that person's face," that she
didn't

have to

mother."

"hold her tongue"

because she didn't

"even with her

Rather, the grievant continued to explain, even in response to
questioning by the Arbitrator, that she was entitled to respond as she
did to the provocations, and entitled to so respond in any future similar
event.
I think the grievant was provoked by what the nurse's aide
revealed to the Rands and possibly to others; and by the unflattering,
judgmental nature of the aide's remarks.
probably

uncontrollably,

and

initiated

the

I think
loud,

she became angry,
screaming,

profane

confrontation with the aide.
That what she did is both explainable and understandable, and
perhaps not an abnormal reaction to what obviously was a highly personal,
if not confidential matter.

But, in an industrial relations sense it is

neither justified nor can it be condoned.
Both in the van, and waiting for the grievance process, the
grievant

must

understand

that personal

matters cannot

be allowed to

overlap into and take over, even partially, the employment setting and
the proper performance of one's job especially where handicapped children
are

passengers.

Here

the

grievant

allowed

that

to

happen.

And

significantly, after a period of weeks when she could have rethought the
matter, still believed and stated at the arbitration hearing that she did
nothing wrong.
If the grievant is to be given another chance, it must be clear
to her and she must know and acknowledge

that like the well-settled

requirement that an employee must carry out a managerial order and then

grieve

if

she

considers

the

order

improper

or

a

violation

of

the

contract, so too must an employee not permit personal or private matters
(or even employment matters) to erupt or arise in the course of her
employment to compromise or interfere with those employment duties or
cause a disruption to the employer's operations.
I recognize that the Company doubts that the grievant will be
able to restrain herself

from

improperly

allowing

personal

or other

matters take over in the employment setting in the future.
That may be so, but perhaps not, considering the passage of
time and reflection resulting from the discipline I will impose.

Indeed,

one of the purposes of discipline, short of discharge, is to effectuate
rehabilitation.
Though a short-service employee, the grievant's prior record is
clear, (except for some absenteeism).
I am constrained to recognize that she was provoked to anger
and irrational

actions; that she is not excused from the disciplinary

consequences of those actions; but that with the proper assurances and
with surveillance, the grievant may be rehabilitatable.
Accordingly,
unusual remedy.

I shall impose what the parties may think is an

But I liken it to a defendant

"purging"

himself of

contempt.
I

shall

give

the grievant

another

chance.

I direct the

grievant's reinstatement one month from the date of this AWARD.
to receive no back pay.

She is

The period of time from her discharge to her

reinstatement shall be a disciplinary suspension for her misconduct.

However, her reinstatement
her

assurance

to the

Company

in one month is conditioned upon

that she now

recognizes

that

personal

matters may not be allowed to intrude into the employment setting to
disrupt or interfere with job performance, and that she promises not to
so act in the future.

And that she recognizes the improprieties and

unacceptable nature of her actions that led to this case.
her

to

be

reinstated,

these

acknowledgments

and

Finally for

assurance

must

be

satisfactory to the Company but not arbitrarily rejected by the Company.
I shall expressly retain jurisdiction of this case for application and
implementation of the foregoing.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

DATED:

May 16, 1997

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

ss :

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument,
which is my AWARD.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN LOCAL 100 TRANSPORT
WORKERS UNION -AND- WHITE PLAINS BUS
OMPANY, INC.
x

IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPINION AND AWARD

LOCAL 100, TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION
and
WHITE PLAINS BUS COMPANY, INC.
-X

The issue is whether MANUEL GONZALEZ was improperly
denied certain extra work assignments (weekend work on
charters and camp transportation) when such work was
assigned bus drivers with less seniority.
A hearing was held on December 10, 1996 at which time Mr.
Gonzalez (hereinafter referred to as the "grievant") and representatives
of the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Counsel

filed post-hearing memoranda.
The

pertinent

contract

provision

is

Article

6

which

in

significant part reads:
All assignments for weekend work shall be posted and
assigned by seniority and qualifications

(emphasis

added).
There
seniority

is

no

dispute

to claim the weekend

"qualifications."

that

the

work.

grievant
The

enjoys

dispute

sufficient

centers

on his

It is the Company's position that the grievant, a satisfactory
school bus driver, does not have an adequate command of the English
language to handle the special communications requirements of charters and
camp trips.

The grievant's native language is Spanish.

The Company explains that he can handle regular school bus runs
because they are routine, repetitive, and are scheduled by the Company
near to the Company's headquarters so that assistance can be provided him
speedily if needed.1
But,

asserts

the

Company,

charters

specialized, long distanced and not routine.

and

camp

trips

are

And that the communications

requirements of charters and camp trips demand more fluency in English
than the grievant possesses.
The Union disputes the Company's claims regarding the grievant's
limitations with the English language.

It points out that he became a

United States citizen in 1988, passing the citizenship test given in
English.

And that he passed the test in English for his New York State

Commercial driver's license.
The Union asserts that the grievant speaks English as he drives
his

regular

school

routes,

speaks

English on the radio to Company

headquarters and reports problems by radio in English.

*In this regard the Company points out that because of the
grievant's poor command of English and because as a consequence
he was unable to handle some unruly students, the school
districts of Elmsford and Lyndhurst rejected him as a driver of
students in those districts. I note, however, that those
situations occurred not only about three years ago, but before
the Union became the certified representative on the property.
So, as those disqualifications could not be protested or
challenged at that time by the Union on the grievant's behalf, I
do not find a precedential value under the collective bargaining
agreement that bears on the instant dispute.

The grievant's testimony at the hearing in this matter revealed,
unquestionably, his difficulties with the English language.

For much of

his testimony he could not understand the questions put to him in English
from counsel and from the arbitrator.

For the most part he was unable to

answer or respond to those questions in English.
testifying

I am sure he was nervous

and that may have inhibited his ability to understand and

respond in English.

But that is relevant.

Charters and camp trips may,

more than routine and near-in school transportation, involve unusual and
unpredictable circumstances which may well create tensions and nervousness
with an attendant inability to give and get instructions or essentially
deal with those circumstances in the English language.
The contractual Management Rights clause provides, inter alia;
The Union recognizes that the Employer shall have the
sole jurisdiction over the management and operation of
its

business

and

direction

of

its

working

force...subject to the provision of this agreement.
Under

the

circumstances

presented,

I

cannot

conclude the

Company's determination that the grievant lacked the language skills for
the

disputed

weekend

unreasonable.
"qualifications"

It's

work

to

be

judgement

for that work was

arbitrary, discriminatory
that

the

grievant

or even

lacked

the

not an improper exercise of its

managerial rights and not, therefore, a violation of Article 6 of the
contract.
However, this is not to say that the grievant is permanently
barred from charter or camp work.

If he improves his command of the

English language to a requisite level, he should be given a chance to
exercise his seniority and claim that work.

I am prepared to review this situation eight months from the
date of this AWARD.
petition

me

for

At that time the Union shall have the right to

a

hearing

on

the

question

of

the

grievant's then

qualifications.
The

Undersigned,

bargaining agreement
heard the proofs

Impartial

Chairman

under

the

collective

between the above-named parties, and having duly

and allegations of said parties makes the following

AWARD:
The Company's denial of the claims of MANUEL GONZALEZ
for weekend work assignments of charter runs and camp
trips,

did

not

violate the

collective bargaining

agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz, Impartial Chairman

DATED:

January 27, 1997

STATE OF NEW YORK

)

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

ss:
)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Impartial
Chairman that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,
ADMINISTRATOR
-X
IN THE MATTER OF THE ARBITRATION
between
OPIONION AND AWARD
CASE #13300114097

LOCAL 1175, ASPHALT PLANT WORKERS
-andWILLETS POINT ASPHALT CORP.

The stipulated issue is:

Was there just cause for the discharge
of Allen Del Vecchio, Jr.?

If not, what

shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on December 4, 1997, at which time, Mr.
Del

Vecchio,

Jr.,

representatives
concerned

were

hereinafter

referred

to

as

the

"grievant"

of the above-named Union and Company appeared.
afforded

full

opportunity

to

offer

argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

evidence

and
All
and

The Arbitrator's

Oath was waived.
The
office.

grievant

Thereafter,

was hired
in February

in December 1996
1997, without

in the

shipping

objection from the

Union or the grievant he was transferred to the job Maintenance Man
Helper (a/k/a "Welder-helper").

Indeed, it appears that the transfer

was mutually agreed upon.
It

is

undisputed

that

employees

in

the

classification

maintenance man and maintenance man helper are required to perform a
variety of duties "outside" in the Company's yard, including ascending
heights on the asphalt production equipment, to perform maintenance,
repairs, and operational work on the elevated bins.
The grievant has an acknowledged phobia of heights.
psychologically unable to climb to the heights of the bins.

He is

He tried

to do so once after he was transferred to the "outside" and "froze" in
the attempt.

Therefore, he was unable to perform maintenance, repair

and operational assignments aloft.
It is the Company's contention that because the grievant is
unable to perform those functions at and atop the bins, he cannot
carry out the full duties of his job and that his discharge for that
reason was warranted and justified.
It is undisputed that at least as early as when the grievant
was transferred from shipping to the "outside" the Company was told of
or knew of his height phobia, and that discussions of that problem
were engaged in by the Company and the Union representatives.

It is

also undisputed that the grievant's work as a shipper and thereafter
his

performance

on

the

ground

as

a maintenance

man

helper

were

satisfactory.
What is in dispute and is the determinative factor in this
case is whether when transferred to the "outside" from shipping there
was an agreement or understanding between the Union and the Company
that because of his height phobia the grievant would not be required
to climb aloft and would be assigned duties on the ground only.
The Union asserts that there was just such an agreement;
that the Company's discharge of the grievant was violative of that
agreement; and that the Company hired a replacement for the grievant
(an experienced asphalt worker who could climb the heights required)
primarily to get rid of the grievant.
I find that in the absence of any objection or challenge to
the grievant's move from shipping to the "outside," his discharge was
justified unless there was the agreement alleged by the Union.
A significant component of the job of maintenance man helper
is climbing aloft to maintain, repair and operate the asphalt bins and
the grievant

could not do that work.

It is well-settled that an

inability to perform a significant function of a job classification is
grounds for removal from employment.
Based on the evidence before me, I am unable to conclude
that an unequivocal agreement was reached between the Union and the

Company

that

testimony,

the

the

grievant

Company

was

excused

from

disputes the Union's

climbing.

Through

claim on this point,

asserting instead that on several occasions it told the Union that it
was concerned about the grievant's inability to climb; that originally
and throughout the grievant's employment "outside" it told the Union
that it "would see" how the grievant did and whether it could tolerate
his limitation.
the

grievant

The Company explained that it thought and said that
might

have

been

able

to

overcome

his

phobia.

But, it asserts, the time and point came when it was apparent that he
could not surmount his problem and that his limitation could no longer
be

accepted because work

aloft was needed by

an employee

in the

grievant's classification.
The burden of establishing the agreement asserted by the
Union, is on the Union.
maintenance

man

helper

contractual

obligation

For it represents a change in the duties of a
and
of

more

the

significantly

unionized

a

change

"outside"

work

in

the

force

to

perform all tasks, including the climbing requirement.
As

such, more definitive and conclusive

evidence of any

agreement changing the classification and the contractual obligation
is needed

than

the disputed verbal testimony of the Union.

For

evidentiary purpose, the agreement, if there was one, should have been
in written form

(as a contract change) or, at least, the "verbal"

discussions should have been much more probative and unequivocal.

Therefore,

I am constrained to conclude that no

precise

agreement was reached under which the Company obligated itself to a
accept and tolerate the grievant's problem.
the

Company

reserved

only

its

agreed

rights

to

"see

how

if the grievant

Rather, I conclude that

the grievant
did not

performed"

and

overcome

his height

find sufficient probative

evidence to

phobia.
In short,
conclude

that

I cannot

the

Company

waived

any

such

reservation

or

unconditionally give up its managerial right to remove from its employ
an

employee

who

cannot

perform

a

significant

duty

of

his

job

classification.
Nor do I find, as the Union argues, that the Company hired a
new employee for the bad faith purpose of discharging the grievant.
Rather, in my view and considering my finding that there is
insufficient proof of agreement between the Union and the Company, the
hiring of the new employee was because working aloft was needed and
someone had to do what the grievant could not do.
grievant's

deficiency

dictated

his

In other words, the

replacement,

and

was

not

an

arbitrarily pre-conceived plan to fire him.
This inexorable conclusion is personally regrettable because
the grievant appears to me to be a well-intentioned, intelligent young
man who tried to perform the required duties but was unable to do so
because

of

a non-willful psychological

phobia

which he could not

overcome.

If there is other full-time work that he can do to the

Company's satisfaction, it is for the Company in its discretion to so
determine, but beyond the authority of the arbitrator to order.
The
having

duly

Undersigned,
heard

the

duly

proofs

designated
and

as

allegations

the
of

Arbitrator

and

the above-named

parties, makes the following AWARD:
The discharge

of Allen De Veccio, Jr.

was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitration

DATED:

December 19, 1997

STATE OF NEW YORK

)
ss :

COUNTY OF NEW YORK

)

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Impartial Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

